Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

Spring 7-23-2013

Macroeconomic and Political Determinants of
Foreign Direct Investment in the Middle East
Robin Barnaby Calver
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Econometrics Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, and the Other Political Science
Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Calver, Robin Barnaby, "Macroeconomic and Political Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in the
Middle East" (2013). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1074.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1074

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Macroeconomic and Political Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment
in the Middle East

by
Robin Barnaby Calver

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Political Science

Thesis Committee:
Birol Yesilada, Chair
Ronald Tammen
Melody Valdini

Portland State University
2013

© 2013 Robin Barnaby Calver

Abstract
This study argues that governments with sustained GDP growth, open markets,
low country risk, high levels and low standard deviation of government performance, and
few or no occurrences of war, will see larger levels of foreign direct investment (FDI)
over time. Scholarship on the determinants of FDI variously argues the influence of GDP
growth, the openness of a country's economy, a government's level of political capacity,
the level of country risk, and the negative effects of inter-, intra- and extrastate conflict.
These studies on the various effects on FDI, while providing insightful and substantial
statistical results, fail to capture the simultaneous effects of macroeconomic, government
performance, country risk, and war variables. The present study attempts to resolve this
gap in the literature on FDI by proposing a multi-dimensional model of the combined
effects of un-weighted macroeconomic, political, country risk, and war variables on FDI
flows over time. The empirical results confirm the expected multi-dimensional nature of
FDI flows over time and provide insight into the macroeconomic and political effects on
regional and country-level yearly flows of FDI, as well as yielding some unexpected and
counter-intuitive results of the role war plays on FDI flows over time.
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Introduction
This study asks the question, what are the movers of yearly flows of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) over time in a given region or country? This study proposes and
assesses the theory that over time FDI in the Middle East is moved by not one but a
combination of macroeconomic, government performance, country risk, and conflict
factors. This study makes a national level, time series (1993 - 2007) comparison of
fourteen countries in the Middle East. These countries are: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the
United Arab Emirates. While Afghanistan, in the popular imagination and in scholarship,
is often considered to be part of the Middle East, the lack of data on FDI flows renders it
presently untenable as a subject of analysis. This is an important question for the
following reasons, among others. First, investors seeking to either expand existing or
new markets are confronted with many indicators as to the feasibility and suitability of an
environment for investing and a set of useful and replicable indicators can aid in these
endeavors. Second, increased or sustained flows of FDI, when combined with dyadic
analyses, can indicate the stability of interstate political relationships. Third, developing
or expanding economies tend to look to foreign investment to supplement domestic
efforts in spurring new sector infrastructure development and market development.
Therefore, a set of indicators that foreign directors may be considering is useful in
informing the domestic and foreign policies of target countries.
Numerous empirical studies have theorized and demonstrated that investors place
their money in countries that demonstrate economic growth or growth potential, have
1

policies conducive to capital flows, have effective governance, stable investment
environments, and that lack war and conflict. The results of this study's analysis may
indicate the following about political economy. First, macroeconomic phenomena may
be moved by a variety of non-macroeconomic variables. Second, market feasibility may
not necessarily be hampered by conflict. Last, an aggregate of factors may be a useful set
of starting points in order to address country-level FDI potential from a comparativist
perspective.
This study tests and evaluates various theories in the literature that have tried to
determine what variable or variables are moving FDI flows in both developed and
developing countries, particularly in the Middle East. This study contributes to the
literature by testing the extent, if any, to which macroeconomic, government
performance, country risk, and war factors move FDI flows over time at the regional and
country level.
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Chapter 1 - Review of the Literature
Introduction
It is advantageous for a multinational corporation to be an early entrant in an
emerging market. Early entry provides market power which yields monopolistic profits
resulting from new sources of demand, acquisition of cheaper raw materials, and
economies of scale (McGowan Jr and Moeller 2009, 28). Thus, a model to shed light on
the movers of FDI is advantageous to private businesses and governments wishing to
create business ties or establish or increase interdependence. For example, FDI brings
with it not just capital that would be difficult to generate through domestic savings, but
also the transfer of up-to-date technologies (Lipsey 2007). Thus, FDI and transfer of
capital can bring with them economic growth and development. For example, Klasra
(2011) states that FDI affects economic growth through various venues like increasing
capital formation, advanced technology and know-how, employment and possible
spillover effects on local firms. Many studies have tried to quantify FDI's contribution to
economic growth and have come up with mixed results (Klasra 2011, 224).
FDI can alter the dynamics of a country's trade and comparative advantage. By
altering a country's comparative advantages and improving its competitiveness through
technology transfer and the effects of myriad externalities, foreign as well as domestic
investment can alter a country's volume and pattern of trade in many income-enhancing
directions (Lipsey 2007). Income enhancement can be beneficial for infrastructure,
human growth, and political growth. Like any other region, the Middle Eastern
3

countries are looking to investors outside their countries to increase their economic
development. FDI plays a significant role in the development of international trade, and
it helps to establish direct, stable, and long-lasting links between economies. The
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that FDI can
serve as an important vehicle for local enterprise development, strengthening the
competitiveness of both the recipient and investor (Groh and Wich 2012, 211). For
example, Turkey in particular is pursuing further political and monetary integration with
Europe. In that case maintaining a government effectiveness that is conducive to foreign
investment and increases comparative advantage is integral to its integrationist
aspirations.
FDI demonstrates the ability of a government to allow and facilitate the influx of
foreign capital to advance national or private-sector goals. It increases the extractive
potential for the government because it provides an additional source of taxable funds.
These funds can in turn be used to provide for infrastructure and other structural
advances. Additionally, a country that has accumulated unsustainable debt may need new
inflows of FDI to mobilize development finance (Onyeiwu and Shrestha 2004, 89).
Some studies suggest that certain macroeconomic conditions or host-country
characteristics foster FDI interest. Tied to Dunning's (1981) ownership, location, and
internationalization framework as well as Markusen's (1995) knowledge capital, and
vertical and horizontal integration models that focused on firm-level decisions,
macroeconomic conditions provide varying incentives for foreign investors. Positive
macroeconomic conditions such as high domestic growth rates, rising per capita GDP,
4

and larger markets indicate a promising domestic market (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007,
837).
The literature on FDI determinants is generally divided into four categories: (a)
macroeconomic and host-country conditions; (b) economic reforms; (c) level of
democratization; and (d) follow the flag/security considerations. The present study
divides the theories of the determinants of FDI into four categories: macroeconomic,
government performance, country risk (economic climate), and war. The following
review of the literature discusses and critiques these various approaches and argues why
an aggregate of these categories is necessary to capture the full dynamic of FDI flows in
the Middle East.
Macroeconomic Factors of FDI Flows: GDP Growth and Openness of Economy
The first macroeconomic variable this study assesses as accounting for variance in
FDI flows over time is GDP Growth. Coan and Kugler (2008) have argued that
economic growth is an indicator consistently included in empirical studies of FDI. The
future potential of a nation's economy has direct effects not simply upon the level of
capital available at any given point in time, but also on changes in the economic incentive
structure of the population, on the type of FDI available, and on overall investment
opportunities (Chen and Mohsin, 1997; Billington, 1999). More specifically, changes in
growth can both attract new FDI and alter the dynamics of older FDI, as the incentive
structures of the population change in relation to the changing levels of income.
Development leads not only leads to increased customer bases, but to more
5

important shifts within industries in host economies, which may in time spur future FDI
(Wheeler and Mody, 1992; (Coan and Kugler 2008, 404). Studies on FDI have found a
positive relationship between economic growth and FDI (Chakrabarti 2001; Onyeiwu and
Shrestha 2004). Apart from having large domestic markets, high-growth economies
typically implement stable and credible macroeconomic policies that attract foreign
investors (Onyeiwu and Shrestha 2004, 95).
The second macroeconomic variable this study assesses as accounting for
variance in FDI flows over time is the Openness of a country's economy. This study
draws on the literature that expresses the Openness of a country's economy as a
quantitative expression of the volume of its imports and exports, and argues it is a
qualitative expression of its policy on the extent of its economic flows to and from the
country. As such, in the literature a country's economic openness is considered to be a
mover of FDI flows.
Among the macroeconomic theories that speak to the positive effect of a region or
country's Openness on FDI, Dunning (1998) argues that rent seeking, market seeking,
efficiency seeking and strategic-asset are motivating factors of FDI inflows. More
specifically, 'rent-seeking' motives involve foreign firms seeking cheaper factors of
production and inputs of production such as primary goods. 'Market seeking' FDI motive
involves foreign firms exporting or opening new markets in host countries in order to
increase sales. This is an alternative for businesses to face trade restrictions like high
transport costs and rules of origin. The 'efficiency seeking' companies want to use a
small number of countries to serve larger markets. Some important factors in this motive
6

are location, government regulation and endowments. Finally the 'strategic-asset' motive
is related to maintaining foreign firms' international position and competitiveness
(Liargovas and Skandalis 2012, 324).
Additional support for the use of Openness as a mover of FDI can be found in
discussions on the ease of ingress and egress of liquidity and securities. The ease with
which investors can move capital in and out of a country (the openness of the economy)
is an important determinant of FDI flows (Chakrabarti 2001). Countries with capital
controls and restrictive trade policies discourage inflows of FDI, compared to countries
with liberal policies. Most of the studies on FDI in developing countries have identified a
positive relationship between openness and FDI (Onyeiwu and Shrestha 2004, 95).
Open economies are more likely to implement and maintain stable and credible
macroeconomic policies than autarkic regimes. Since stable macroeconomic policies
(including low inflation rates) tend to reduce business risks, foreign investors are more
prone to investing in open economies than in closed economies. Foreign investors can
repatriate their earnings with relative ease in open economies, and the risk of arbitrary
expropriation of assets is low in such economies. To that end, Onyeiwu and Shrestha
argue that the incorporation of an Openness variable results in a positive effect on FDI,
which is consistent with previous studies (Kravis and Lipsey 1982; Culem 1988; Edwards
1990; Asiedu 2002) (Onyeiwu and Shrestha 2004, 100).
Klasra argues there are several studies providing evidence about the positive
effects of Openness of a country on its economic growth and exports. For example,
Arslan and Wijnbergen (1993), Joshi and Little (1996) and other studies have found that
7

trade liberalization in developing countries caused improvements in their economic
performance (2011). The logic behind this outcome has been the exposition that trade
liberalization reduces anti-export bias and makes exports more competitive in
international markets. Some studies, however, show some skepticism regarding the link
between openness and export performance (Greenaway and Sapsfor 1994; Jenkins 1996;
Greenaway et al. 2002) (Klasra 2011, 224). The present study, however, is concerned
with the movers of FDI and not the interrelationship of FDI and exports, or economic
growth and exports. For example, Klasra used a slightly different methodology of
annual time series data on foreign direct investment (FDI), gross domestic product
(GDP), export, and trade openness from 1975 - 2004. Therefore, the presents study uses
Openness as an indicator, both conceptual and quantitative, of the macroeconomic and
political decision-making dynamics of a country and how they together under the rubric
of Openness may influence or explain some of the variance of FDI over time. Similarly,
in order to avoid any operational problems arising from endogeneity, the present study
uses only one indicator of exports (in the Openness score) and not exports as an
additional variable.
In operationalizing Openness Liargovas and Skandalis use exports divided by
GDP, imports divided by GDP and total trade divided by GDP, among others (2012, 327328). Using an econometric model they found a positive and significant relationship
between FDI inflows and trade openness. They also found that there are some other
factors such as political stability, exchange rate stability and market size (as expressed by
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GDP) with positive influence to the existence of FDI (Liargovas and Skandalis 2012,
329)
Government Performance
It is generally argued that governments that are effective or capable, regardless of
how this is defined, are more amenable as venues for FDI and economic growth in
general. Although a variety of measures have been advanced to measure political
performance, there has been a lack of consensus over the best way to conceptualize it or
what it is ultimately the dependent variable being measured. To place Government
Performance at the door of being a function of regime type, economic power, military
capabilities, or population is to simply re-name these variables (Kugler and Tammen
2012). Therefore, an indicator of Government Performance is useful in providing an
investor with a quantitative means of assessing the effectiveness and stability of
government policies. Follows is a discussion of the various theories of measuring
Government Performance.
The World Bank has conceptualized capacity in “good governance” terms. "The
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and individual
governance indicators for 213 economies over the period 1996–2010, for six dimensions
of governance: Voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence;
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and, control of corruption. The
aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. The individual data
9

sources underlying the aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations"
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011). To that end, the World Bank defines the
Government Effectiveness indicator as "capturing perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government's commitment to such policies" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011).
Thus, the World Bank's indicators are qualitative, subjective and normative. For
comparative purposes, the World Bank's method of determining Government
Performance, which has no quantitative or objective measures, lacks utility and
measurable variance.
The concept of political capacity advanced by Organski and Kugler (1981) and
later built upon by Arbetman and Kugler (1997) has a large amount of comparative
utility. The power transition program conceptualizes national capacity and political
performance as a government’s extractive capability of resources, in this case taxes
(Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2008; Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Kugler and
Tammen 2012; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1981; Tammen 2000). Government
Performance, as defined by Kugler and Tammen, is measured in Extraction of resources
from the populace (Kugler and Tammen 2012), resulting in the term Relative Political
Extraction (RPE). RPE approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions
of the national output to advance public goals. Among public goals is the economic
development of a country, and this is often advanced through the attraction of FDI.
10

Generally, investors prefer a political environment that is stable, predictable and capable.
Therefore, a state must have the political capacity to create an environment that will
attract FDI. FDI demonstrates the ability of a government to allow and facilitate the
influx of foreign capital to advance national goals. FDI increases the extractive potential
for the government because it provides an additional source of taxable funds. These
funds can in turn be used to provide for infrastructure and other structural advances.
The RPE measure of Government Effectiveness is particularly useful as a
predictor of FDI flows and enjoys strong support in the literature. FDI is a useful
indicator of economic development and government effectiveness because it
demonstrates the willingness of governments to allow ingress and egress in its markets
and the stability of those markets. RPE reflects the strength of the government of a
country. The higher the RPE of a country, the stronger its government, and the more
stable its expected future economic policy. Therefore, Government Effectiveness affects
capital flows through its effect on economic policy (Adji, Ahn, and Holsey 1997, 130).
Because a country with high political capacity is expected to have more stable economic
policies than a country with low political capacity, foreign investors are expected to
invest more in the country with high political capacity (Adji, Ahn, and Holsey 1997,
130). This consideration suggests that relative political capacity will be positively
correlated with foreign private capital flows (Adji, Ahn, and Holsey 1997, 133).
Political uncertainty resulting from the variance of RPE adversely affects private
investment, confirming numerous studies that show uncertainty causes a decrease in
private investment (Grier and Tullock 1989; Rodrik 1991; Aizenman and Marion 1993).
11

Thus, a high level of variability in political capacity increases macropolitical uncertainty,
which in turn decreases private investment in the same way that macroeconomic
uncertainty does. This suggests that a lack of consistency in a government’s capacity to
rule a nation or to organize the society will generate political uncertainty in the
marketplace (Feng and Chen 1997).
LeBlang makes an explicit break with the prevalent convention in the political
development field that economic and political progress go hand in hand (1997, 111).
According to this view, if a nation possesses a large relative amount of wealth, then it
will also be capable of performing efficiently in the political realm. This view is based
on observations of the developmental history of the West. Countries in Western Europe,
parts of North America, and Japan have industrialized and established efficient
bureaucratic structures. The error in this approach is it does not permit the economic and
political structures of a country to be analyzed separately. "… [A]s nations undergo the
transition from preindustrial to industrial development, it is readily observable that the
independence of the political and the economic sectors becomes more profound"
(Leblang 1997, 111) In preindustrial societies a change in the social, economic, or
political sector did not cause a change in the other sectors (Leblang 1997, 111 - 112). By
contrast, in industrial societies even casual observation suggests that a change in the
structure of the economy has direct consequences for the way in which political power is
exercised, and vice-versa (Leblang 1997, 112).
LeBlang, however, does not isolate the relationship between FDI and RPE. He
argues the nonlinear relationship between investment, capacity, and growth. Specifically,
12

he states that the traditional expectation from the political science and economic literature
is that a nation’s level of socioeconomic development is linearly related to its level of
political development. In explaining variations in economic growth, he breaks with
tradition in two significant ways. First, it is posited that the effect of political capacity on
a nation’s growth rate depends on the level of wealth of the nation; that is, there is an
interaction between political and economic development. Second, this interactive effect
is not constant – the effect diminishes as a nation grows wealthier (Leblang 1997, 113).
The role of governance infrastructure has also been put forth as a determinant of
attracting FDI and increasing FDI flows over time. For example, governance
infrastructure has been defined as a country's political, institutional and legal
environment (Globerman and Shapiro 2002). Globerman and Shapiro have shown that
governance infrastructure is an important determinant of both FDI inflows and outflows.
Investments in governance infrastructure not only attract capital, but also create the
conditions under which domestic multinational corporations (MNCs) emerge and invest
abroad. It would appear that investments in governance infrastructure are subject to
diminishing returns, so that the benefits, in terms of inflows, are most pronounced for
smaller and developing economies (Globerman and Shapiro 2002, 1899).
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) argue "positive" governance infrastructure would
therefore include: an effective, impartial and transparent legal system that protects
property and individual rights; public institutions that are stable, credible and honest; and
government policies that favor free and open markets. These conditions encourage FDI,
and presumably private domestic investment as well, by protecting privately held assets
13

from arbitrary direct or indirect appropriation. In a related manner, the same conditions
encourage sunk cost investments by MNCs that facilitate efficient operation in host
countries (Globerman and Shapiro 2002, 1901).
Country Risk
From 1993 to 2007, FDI in the Middle East increased by 3365 percent (World
Bank 2012). This trend provides evidence for the need for multinational corporations to
have access to a reliable model for predicting Country Risk as the risks of entering a new
foreign market directly are not only higher than expanding investments in the domestic
market where conditions are known and more predictable, but are also difficult to
forecast. FDI arises when the host country has an investment opportunity that it cannot
exploit by itself because it lacks the means or technical know-how, or because of market
incompleteness (that is, access to capital markets is restricted). A MNC may be able to
exploit such an opportunity because it has the necessary capital, technology, and
managerial skills to do so.
Obtaining a reliable and accurate forecast of Country Risk is necessary for any
multinational corporation (MNC) decision maker. Generally, Country Risk relates to the
likelihood that changes in a foreign business environment will occur and will reduce the
profitability or riskiness of an overseas FDI. The main components of Country Risk that
investors need to consider are political risk and economic risk for a country. For
example, political risk can refer to the risk that the politics within a country will affect a
multinational's FDI in that country (McGowan Jr and Moeller 2009, 28). Lucas (1990)
14

focuses on the political environment and components of Country Risk, and attributes a
lack of FDI in countries with potentially large marginal returns to capital to the fact that
many developing countries face higher political risk than industrialized ones (Azzimonti
and Sarte 2007, 288). Similarly, Butler and Joaquin (1998, 599) define political risk 'as
the risk that a sovereign host government will unexpectedly change the 'rules of the game'
under which businesses operate.' The authors show how political risk can affect the
future cash flows of FDI and how political risk can be factored into the required rate of
return.
Some scholars have argued that qualitative assessments of institutions or of the
investors themselves are necessary for a strong picture of Country Risk. For example,
Biglaiser and Staats (2008) have argued for the importance of using qualitative research
on the decisions from foreign investors themselves. Biglaiser and Staats (2008) use
questions that relate to political, economic, and geographic factors through the
administration of surveys to chief executive officers (CEOs) of U.S. firms with
operations in Latin America to understand what influences their investment decisions.
They argue that while imputing the motivations of investors based on broad economic
and political measures is justified when there are no other qualitative or survey-based
indicators, they ultimately conclude going directly to the source is better for
understanding investor motivations (Biglaiser and Staats 2010, 508).
Some authors have argued that the quality of institutions can be used as an
indicator of the level of Country Risk. Azzimonti and Sarte (2007) state that a distinctive
characteristic of FDI is that once an investment has been made, a foreign investor cannot
15

prevent the government in the host country from changing the environment in which the
investment decision was made. Despite attempts to establish international tribunals,
contracts between multi-national corporations and sovereign countries are almost
impossible to enforce (Azzimonti and Sarte 2007, 287). The quality of institutions, and
in particular, the degree of protection of property rights, are key in determining the
expected return to foreign investors (Azzimonti and Sarte 2007, 287-288). Thus it
follows that countries with relatively poor legal protection of assets, and a high degree of
political instability, generally exhibit high rates of expropriation and this makes
investment less attractive. In practice, expropriation can take different forms. A direct
act of expropriation involves nationalization of foreign-owned corporations, in which the
government simply takes control of the capital stock (Kobrin 1980, 1984). There are also
indirect forms of expropriation that multinational corporations face. Examples include
excessive taxation, capital controls, manipulation of exchange rates, and bribes and
permits demanded by government officials (Azzimonti and Sarte 2007, 288).
As Jensen and Young (2008) note, several studies use FDI flows as the dependent
variable to study the economic consequences of civil war, and the results vary. Nigh
(1985), Enders and Sandler (1996), Li (2006), Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006), and
Blomberg and Mody (2007) find that past violence has a negative effect on FDI, although
Loree and Guisinger (1995) and Globerman and Shapiro (2003) find mixed results, and
Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh (1989), Li and Resnick (2003), and Sethi et al. (2003) find
no relationship at all (Jensen and Young 2008). Their measurement of Country Risk is
conceptualized as the risk that a government in a host country will unexpectedly change
16

the institutional environment within which businesses operate. Therefore, from a
financial perspective, Country Risk may alter operating cash flows via discriminatory
policies and regulations. Liargovas and Skandalis conclude that a country with high
Country Risk will be less appealing to foreign investors and use the PRS group data to
measure this (2012, 326).
War
The presence of War would seem, on the surface, to greatly influence FDI flows
over time. War is an expression of instability and throws borders, the polity, and
economy all into flux. The presence or anticipation of armed conflicts plays a potentially
crucial role in disrupting not just trade flows (Long, 2008) but also foreign investment.
Furthermore, war risk includes hostile actions taken by national or international forces,
civil war, revolution, insurrection, or terrorism. By avoiding conflicts and ensuring
political stability, host countries can thus create an environment that is favorable to FDI
(Bussmann 2010, 143). To that end, this study assesses the literature on three types of
War - Interstate, Intrastate, and Extrastate - and their effects, if any, on FDI flows over
time.
Interstate War is defined by the Correlates of War project as "wars that take place
between or among states (members of the interstate system)" (Jones 1996). Liberal peace
scholars have pointed to many advantages of economic exchange, finding that FDI tends
to reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict and civil war (Lee and Mitchell 2012, 675).
Increased FDI can reduce the chances for dyadic militarized conflicts and improve
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interstate cooperation levels (Lee and Mitchell 2012, 676). However, some studies find
that military conflict has no significant effect on FDI flows (Lee and Mitchell 2012, 677).
Other scholars have demonstrated that Interstate War can have a positive
correlation with FDI (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007) - this is known as the 'follow the
flag" dynamic. In the initial stage of U.S. multinational enterprises decisions to invest,
FDI flows are negatively affected by conflict and fewer capital controls and positively
impacted by U.S. troops, alliance portfolio similarity, and regime type. "Follow the flag"
factors are important determinants in the initial decision to invest abroad. In the second
stage, the amount of FDI is the dependent variable (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007, 836).
Investment stability provided by U.S. troops and foreign policy similarity are
important indications that economic and security goals are not mutually exclusive.
Although the presence of troops may be initially in response to acute crises and does not
foster American investment, through U.S. government agencies such as Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) that offer risk insurance and other financial incentives to
U.S. firms, the presence of U.S. troops within a country serves as a catalyst for U.S. FDI
(Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007, 836). Second, the outsourcing of military functions to
mostly U.S. private contractors in war-zone areas further attracts U.S. FDI. The fact that
global FDI is negatively correlated with the stationing of U.S. ground troops reinforces
the significance of OPIC and U.S. private contracting. Rather than discouraging FDI,
troops and the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals appear attractive to U.S. investors
(Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007, 836-837).
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Intrastate War is defined by the Correlates of War project as a "war that
predominantly takes place within the recognized territory of a state" (Jones 1996). As
with Interstate War, Intrastate War also can be potentially detrimental to FDI flows. As
Feng and Chen (1997) note, Barro (1991) and Grier and Tullock (1988) find that political
and social uncertainties manifested by revolutions, assassinations, and coups d’etat
discourage private investment. Schneider and Frey (1985) conclude that riots and strikes
have a negative impact on foreign direct investment (Feng and Chen, in Arbetman and
Kugler, eds. 1997: 103).
While not definitionally the same, terrorism can be seen as similar to Intrastate
War insofar as it can be waged by domestic actors against the state. To that end,
terrorism has been shown to have a negative effect on FDI (Enders, Sachsida, and
Sandler 2006; Enders and Sandler 1996) However, there is substantial evidence that
terrorism's effects can be diminished because of the existence of business-related and
non-business-related terrorism (Powers and Choi 2012).
Extrastate War is defined by the Correlates of War project as "wars that take place
between a state(s) and a non-state entity outside the borders of the state" (Jones 1996). In
the Middle East region for the period under study there are not many incidents of
Extrastate War, however there are indicators of political instability. It is instructive,
however, to address the scholarship that considers the impact of domestic political
instability and terrorism on flows of FDI.
Adji, Ahn, and Holsey (1997) used a measure of domestic instability in their
effort to delineate and quantify the effects of macroeconomic, political, and political
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performance effects on FDI. They hypothesized that domestic political instability in a
country, such as political demonstrations, strikes, and riots, may disrupt the economy by
increasing uncertainty about future economic policies, and thereby increasing the risk
associated with any expected future start of profits. Domestic political instability may
also adversely affect investment by generating concern about physical violence toward
foreign investors’ property and employees (Adji, Ahn, and Holsey 1997, 133).
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Chapter 2 - Theory, Model, and Hypotheses
Theory
As noted in the Literature Review, above, scholarship on the determinants of
foreign direct investment (FDI) variously argue the influence of GDP growth, the
openness of a country's its economy, a government's level of political capacity, the level
of country risk, and the negative effects of inter-, intra- and extrastate conflict. These
studies on the various effects on FDI, while providing insightful and substantial statistical
results, fail to capture the simultaneous effects of these macroeconomic, political, country
risk, and war variables.
To answer the question of what are the determinants of the variance in foreign
direct investment flows in the Middle East over the time period of 1993 - 2007 this study
is predicated on the proposition that investors make decisions based on return of
investment, predictability and stability of investment climate, and predictability or lack of
impediments to investments caused by conflict. Therefore, this study proposes the theory
that regional FDI flows over time are explained by a combination of four un-weighted
classes of variables: Macroeconomic, Government Performance, Country Risk, and War.
Additionally, this study undertakes a country-level sub-analysis of selected countries
from the regional group to test the theory's application at the country level. To that end,
due to the somewhat arbitrary construction of a "region" we can expect that the movers of
FDI at the country level will be inter-country similar, yet in the aggregate (i.e. the
regional level) they will be different. Therefore, a more detailed discussion of the
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relevance of the coefficients for each country will be undertaken in the country analysis
section of this study.
It is plausible that the four classes of variables chosen for this study are movers of
yearly flows of foreign direct investment because FDI is susceptible to these major pillars
of political economy. If it is accepted that political economy can be broken down to four
distinct phenomena moving together - macroeconomics, government performance, a
country's economic risk environment, and the presence or absence of conflict - then it
follows that the investment choices of outside entrants into a host country's economy will
be influenced by these four classes. The justification for these four indicators is as
follows. Foreign direct investment is a macroeconomic occurrence that is instigated by
investors, approved by governments, undertaken through analysis of the investment
climate, and can be impeded, or in some cases advanced, by conflict.
This study uses quantitative measures to operationalize the four classes of
variables. The importance of quantitative measures is that they can be replicated and the
moving parts readily identified across all regime types, economies, and time. The present
study addresses multiple regime types, levels of economic development, and spans a
period of time where inter- and intra-country dynamics have been affected by changes in
regimes and war.
Model, Methodology and Statistical Technique Used
The influences on yearly international flows of direct investment are
conceptualized using seven un-weighted independent variables. In order to determine the
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most statistically relevant variables from the four classes (macroeconomic, political,
country risk, and war) moving FDI flows from 1993 - 2007, this study employs a
stepwise linear regression model. Linear regression estimates the coefficients of the
linear equation, involving one or more independent variables that best predict the value of
the dependent variable.
To determine the predictors for yearly flows of FDI over time, the following
linear regression model was used.
µ {Y|Xn} = β0+ β1Xn
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Data for the macroeconomic variables comes from the World Bank (2012) and the
Penn World Tables (Heston 2002). Government Performance data comes from the 2012
dataset on Government Performance (Yesilada 2012). Country Risk data comes from
Euromoney, and war data comes from the Correlates of War project. The data for FDI
contained values that were both negative and zero. To achieve a proper distribution of
the sample, a value of 10 was added to all data points and then a Log 10 transformation
was performed, yielding a normal distribution.
Hypotheses
Based on the above variables, this study tests the following five hypotheses.
Hypothesis One: GDP growth rate (annual percentage)
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The annual percentage that a country's GDP grows is an indication of the increase
in earnings due to exports or investment. If a country experiences GDP growth over
time, then FDI will increase. This suggests that there will be a positive correlation
between GDP growth and FDI over time.
Hypothesis Two: Openness
A country's Openness is its control of the sum of imports and exports to GDP. It
is a political indicator as it is an expression of the degree of ingress and egress of funds to
the country allowed. If a country has a high amount of Openness we can expect that
there will be a positive relationship with FDI.
Hypothesis Three: Government Performance
A country's Government Performance is a measurement of its ability to extract
resources from the population to further the pursuit of national goals. It is a measure of
the ratio of tax to GDP and is not dependent on its relative size of GDP ppp to other
countries. Since FDI attraction may or may not be a national goal, it is unpredictable
whether or not there is a positive correlation of RPE with FDI. The null hypothesis is
that there is no relationship between RPE and FDI.
Hypothesis Four: Country Risk
Country Risk directly affects returns on investment, cost of business, and the
repatriation of capital. If a country has a high degree of risk then it will have a low
amount of FDI, similarly if a country has a low degree of risk then it will have a higher
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relative amount of FDI. Note that the higher a country's score, the lower its degree of
risk. This suggests that a higher Country Risk score, which equates to a lower degree of
risk, will correlate positively with FDI.
Hypothesis Five: War
War is a direct measure of armed conflict with significant deaths and casualties.
Investors are wary of an environment where conflict is present as it suggests an unstable
environment for business. This suggests that War negatively correlates with FDI.
Table 1 Predicted Effects
Determinants of Foreign
Direct Investment

Variables Used in this
Study

Predicted Effect
on FDI

GDP Growth Rate
(annual %)

+

Openness

+

Relative Political
Extraction

+/-

Country Risk

+

Interstate War

-

Intrastate War

-

Extrastate War

-

Macroeconomic

Government
Performance

Country Risk

War
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Chapter 3 - Unit of Analysis and Variables
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is the nation state in a given year. This study
uses a cross-sectional and time-series analysis incorporating fourteen nation states
(Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates over the period of 1993-2007). These units
provide a set of 197 observations.
This time series captures global dynamics of FDI and lends itself to comparison
of similar studies of the determinants of FDI flows over a similar period. For example,
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) argued that by using the Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2010) data allowed them to distinguish different elements or indicators of
governance, but restricted the coverage to the period since 1996. The recent period of
this study is appropriate as there was a global increase in FDI for the mid-1990s and
many countries implemented economic liberalization in the early 1990s that attracted
FDI. Agosin and Machado (2007) report that the major increase in their "openness to
FDI" index was during 1990-96, with only small changes after 1996. These global and
policy influences on FDI are unlikely to confound inferences from a sample for the
period 1996 -2009 (Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol 2012, 437).
Furthermore, this data set incorporates states that are both in the early stages and
the mature stages of economic development, giving it a large explanatory power of how
political and economic factors can move FDI regardless of stage of development.
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Additionally, the countries selected represent a large variance in GDP growth, openness
of economy, government performance, country risk, and presence of war.
Defining and Identifying Local Hierarchies
The units of analysis are aggregated into a political-geographic region defined as
the Middle East - a regional hierarchy within the global hierarchy as first defined by
A.F.K. Organski (1958). The Middle East is a region of perpetual interest due to its geopolitical dynamics and its role as a hub for energy production and trade dynamics with
other regions. This study's definition of the Middle East hierarchy draws from, but
contrasts with, Lemke's (2002) method of identifying regional hierarchies. Lemke's
(2002) formulation of identifying local hierarchies, i.e. a hierarchy in a politicalgeographic region, is that the members will consider each other when developing their
foreign policies and planning for various military contingencies (68). Since this study is
undertaken in the broader context of power transition theory, states in a hierarchy must
have the ability to fight with each other (Lemke, 2002: 68). Thus, Lemke locates states
in hierarchies based on a notion of proximity and interaction and the ability to interact
militarily. Specifically, a hierarchy is composed of “sets of dyads with the ability to
reach each other militarily; each state within a dyad has the ability to exert military
influence within the other’s territories.” Lemke considered military potential, power
projection, terrain, and distance to generate a list of regional subsystems. The problems
here are apparent. Military capabilities change over time and are affected by technology.
Terrain and distance can be overcome and power can be projected through computers etc.
Lemke's formulation, even for 2002, does not take into account non-hardware or
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intangible military interactions. For example, one of the greatest threats to states comes
in the form of cyber-warfare.
Additionally, Lemke has rejected the various approaches of identifying local
hierarchies based on a combination of cultural similarities, trade patterns, common IGO
membership, alliances, demographic similarities, and geographic proximity. He argues
that neither of these tendencies is completely useful in either a general sense or in terms
of his specific evaluation of the multiple hierarchy model (Lemke, 2002: 68). Based on
the above formulations and criteria, Lemke defines the Middle East as fifteen states:
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (2002).
This study, however, is not convinced that Lemke's formulation of a Middle East
hierarchy is conceptually correct when assessing the subjective perceptions of other states
and their polities when they think of the Middle East. When assessing the attraction of
FDI, the conceptual aims of the analysis must be taken into account. It is reasonable to
state that as of the writing of this study, in the popular imagination of the West, the
Middle East is considered to include Pakistan, due to its proximity to the other Middle
Eastern countries, its geopolitical role, and its nexus with terrorism and extrastate war.
This study also departs from Lemke's definition of the Middle East due to the availability
of data for Yemen, and for that reason Yemen was no considered in the analysis.
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Variables
The Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable 1: FDI/Capital Flows at the regional level
The first dependent variable is yearly international flows of FDI in the Middle
East. FDI in the Middle East has grown nearly 3400 percent from 1993-2007 (World
Bank, 2011). FDI are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy
other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings,
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments
(World Bank, 2011).
FDI is measured as the net inflows in the reporting economy (% of GDP) as
reported by the World Bank (2012). Due to the use of linear regression in assessing the
effects of the independent variables on FDI the FDI data is transformed through a
logarithm to improve the linearity.
Dependent Variable 2: FDI/Capital Flows at the country level
The second dependent variable is yearly international flows of foreign direct
investment in individual countries in the Middle East region. These countries are
selected based on geopolitical interest and their representativeness of what might be
assumed to be the strongest variable moving FDI. For example, it could be assumed that
in countries with a recent history of war such as Iraq, war is the strongest intervening
29

variable in limiting FDI. Similarly, a country's level of Government Performance, such
as in Israel, could be considered the prime mover of FDI inflows. To that end, a country
that quantitatively exemplifies the effects of each independent variable is selected to
empirically assess whether or not that independent variable has the same effect on FDI in
the stepwise regression model at the country level as it does at the regional level.
The Independent Variables
The independent variables of this study are organized into four categories:
Macroeconomic, Government Performance, Country Risk, and War.
Macroeconomic
Independent Variable 1: GDP growth (annual %)
GDP growth in the Middle East has increased 11.29 percent from 1993-2007.
Data for this measurement comes from the World Bank Economic Indicators of 2012.
Independent Variable 2: Openness to Trade
Openness to trade must be considered as both a macroeconomic and a political
mover of FDI because it is both a quantifiable expression of the ingress and egress of
trade, and it conceptually captures the political willingness to allow such. Openness to
trade in the Middle East has increased 20 percent from 1993-2007.
Openness to Trade ("Openness" or "OPENC") data comes from the Penn World
Tables (Heston 2002) which uses the following equation: exports plus imports divided
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by GDP equals the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The export and import figures are
in national currencies from the World Bank and United Nations data archives. Note that
when the export and import figures and GDP are expressed in real values, the value of
OPENC will be the same because the price level (conversion factor) for DA and exports
and imports is the same.
Political
Independent Variable 3: Government Performance
Government Performance is measured using the data for Relative Political
Extraction (RPE). RPE is the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the
national output to advance public goals and is an expression of the degree to which a
regime is stable (Arbetman and Kugler, eds. 1997). This study uses the RPE
measurement with the agriculture control ratio because it allows states that are heavily
dependent on agriculture to be compared with states that are more developed and
diversified in their economy.
Data on RPE comes from a data set compiled by Yesilada et al. (2012) using
primary sources from the World Bank economic indicators. This study uses the Frontier
Extraction measurement of RPE.
Country Risk
Independent Variable 4: Country Risk Measurement
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Country Risk is the investment risk of a country, such as risk of default on a bond,
risk of losing direct investment, risk to global business relations, and repatriation of
capital. Country Risk must be considered when assessing FDI flows over time because it
captures the political and economic climate of a country, and when aggregated of a
region.
The Country Risk measurement captures many economic and macroeconomic
variables that other studies have been disaggregated or treated as independent variables
moving FDI (see above). This study uses data from the Euromoney Country Risk
Rankings tables which evaluate the investment risk of a country, such as risk of default
on a bond, risk of losing direct investment, risk to global business relations etc, by taking
a qualitative model, which seeks an expert opinion on risk variables within a country
(70% weighting) and combining it with three basic quantitative values (30% weighting)
("Country Risk Rankings 1993" 1993; "Country Risk Rankings 1994" 1994; "Country
Risk Rankings 1995" 1995; "Country Risk Rankings 1996" 1996; "Country Risk
Rankings 1997" 1997; "Country Risk Rankings 1998" 1998; "Country Risk Rankings
1999" 1999; "Country Risk Rankings 2000" 2000; "Country Risk Rankings 2001"
2001; "Country Risk Rankings 2002" 2002; "Country Risk Rankings 2003" 2003;
"Country Risk Rankings 2004" 2004; "Country Risk Rankings 2005" 2005; "Country
Risk Rankings 2006" 2006; "Country Risk Rankings 2007" 2007). The factors included
in the ranking of countries by risk are: Political risk, Economic performance/projections,
structural assessment, debt indicators, credit ratings, access to bank finance, and access to
capital markets. The Euromoney Country Risk rating provides a composite measure and
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does not present problems of collinearity. The methodology used by Euromoney for their
Country Risk score is as follows.
To obtain the overall Country Risk score, Euromoney assigns a weighting to six
categories. The three qualitative expert opinions are political risk (30% weighting),
economic performance (30%), and structural assessment (10%). The three quantitative
values are debt indicators (10%), credit ratings (10%), and access to bank finance/capital
markets (10%).
The qualitative average is produced by combining evaluations of political,
economic, and structural assessments from experts around the world. When applying
political, economic, and structural assessments to a 100 point scale for the qualitative
average only (rather than the full Euromoney Country Risk score), the following
weighting is used: political 43%, economic 43%, and structural 14%.
The qualitative assessments of Country Risk are made as follows. For economic
risk participants rate each country for which they have knowledge from 0-10 across 6 sub
factors to equal a score out of 100. The categories of economic risk scored are as follows:
bank stability/ risk; GNP outlook; unemployment rate; government finances; monetary
policy/ currency stability. For political risk participants rate each country for which they
have knowledge from 0-10 across 5 sub factors to equal a score out of 100. The
categories of political risk scored are as follows: corruption; government non-payments/
non-repatriation; government stability; information access/ transparency; institutional
risk; regulatory and policy environment.
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For structural risk participants rate each country for which they have knowledge
from 0-10 across 4 sub factors to equal a score out of 100. The categories of structural
risk scored are as follows: demographics; hard infrastructure; labor market/ industrial
relations; soft infrastructure. Individual experts must apply a value to each sub factor
before their score is accepted into the system. Individual experts can also modify the sub
factor weights to modify their effect on the overall score of 100. The weight of an
individual sub factor can be lowered to a minimum of 10% and to a maximum of 30%.
This allows the system to capture a second attribute along side of the evaluation of that
category, which is the estimated effect of the category. For instance, a user may make a
judgment that the single most important issue facing a given country is maintaining the
stability of its currency, and so decide to increase the weighting of the monetary policy/
currency stability category from 20% to 30%.
Within each sub factor, Euromoney Country Risk also asks experts for further
information on the reasons behind each individual score, and these fall under the category
of related factors. These are more like poll points, and do not directly affect the score.
Instead, they inform a change made to a sub factor score and weight. For example, within
the economic risk category of bank stability lie four further related factors: regulatory
risk, trading exposures, asset quality and undercapitalization. Individual experts are able
to add more related factors and ignore ones which are not applicable.
The quantitative score factors are derived as follows. For access to bank
finance/capital markets participants rate each country's accessibility to international
markets on a scale of 0 -10 (0=no access at all and 10=full access). These scores are
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averaged and then weighted to 10%. For debt indicators scores are calculated using the
following ratios from the World Bank's Global Development Finance figures: total debt
stocks to GNP (A), debt service to exports (B); current account balance to GNP (C).
Developing countries which do not report complete debt data get a score of zero.
For credit ratings nominal values are assigned to sovereign ratings from Moody's,
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA. The ratings are converted into a score using a set
scoring chart. This score is then averaged and the score weighted to 10%.
If a country has a high degree of risk then it will have a low amount of FDI,
similarly if a country has a low degree of Country Risk then it will have a higher relative
amount of FDI. Note that the higher a country's score, the lower its degree of risk.
According to the hypothesis, a higher Country Risk score, which equates to a lower
degree of risk, will correlate positively with FDI. Where there is no rating, countries
score zero.
War
The measures of War for this study are in three categories: Interstate, Intrastate,
and Extrastate War.
Independent Variable 5: Interstate War
The presence or absence of interstate war is measured with a dummy variable of
either 1 or 0, using the Correlates of War database on international conflict (Sarkees
2010). Interstate War is defined by the Correlates of War project as "wars that take place
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between or among states (members of the interstate system)." "Within the COW
typology, an inter-state war must meet some definitional requirements of all wars in that
the war must involve sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a
minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period. In
Resort to Arms, Correlates of War scholars Melvin Small and J. David Singer further
established the requisite condition that for a conflict to be a war, it must involved armed
forces capable of "effective resistance" on both sides. The effective resistance criteria
were specifically utilized to differentiate wars from massacres, one-sided state killings, or
general riots by unorganized individuals. Such one-sided violence is not considered to be
the same phenomenon as war and is not included here. As with all categories of war, for
a state to be considered a war participant, the minimum requirement is that it has to either
commit 1,000 troops to the war or suffer 100 battle-related deaths (Sarkees 2010).
A table of the interstate wars used in the time-series under analysis is included in
Table 38 Interstate Wars.
Independent Variable 6: Intrastate War
The presence or absence of Intrastate War is measured with a dummy variable of
either 1 or 0, using the Correlates of War database on international conflict (Sarkees
2010). Intrastate War is defined by the Correlates of War project as a "war that
predominantly takes place within the recognized territory of a state." Within the COW
war typology, an intrastate war must meet the same definitional requirements of all wars
in that the war must involve sustained combat, involving organized armed forces,
resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month
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period. When Correlates of War scholars Melvin Small and J. David Singer first
extended their study of war to include intra-state wars in Resort to Arms, they established
the requisite condition that for a conflict to be a war, it must involve armed forces
capable of "effective resistance" on both sides. They then developed two alternative
criteria for defining effective resistance: "(a) both sides had to be initially organized for
violent conflict and prepared to resist the attacks of their antagonists, (b) the weaker side,
although initially unprepared, is able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five
percent of the number of fatalities it sustains." The effective resistance criteria were
specifically utilized to differentiate wars from massacres, one-sided killings, or general
riots by unorganized individuals. Such one-sided violence is not considered to be the
same phenomenon as war and is not included here. However, this distinction is
sometimes difficult to make particularly in intrastate conflict (Sarkees 2010).
A table of the intra-state wars used in the time-series under analysis is included in
Table 39 Intrastate Wars.
Independent Variable 7: Extrastate War
The presence or absence of Extrastate War is measured with a dummy variable of
either 1 or 0, using the Correlates of War database on international conflict (Sarkees
2010). Extrastate War is defined by the Correlates of War project as "wars that take
place between a state(s) and a non-state entity outside the borders of the state'. "An extrastate war involves fighting a state system member outside its borders against the armed
forces of an entity that is not a member of the state system. Within the current COW war
typology, an extra-state war must meet some definitional requirements of all wars in that
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the war must involve sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a
minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period. The
requirement for sustained combat resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths
per year among all parties is a shift from the initial practice (in Wages of War and Resort
to Arms) of counting only the system-member deaths." (emphasis in original) (Sarkees
2010).
A table of the extra-state wars used in the time-series under analysis is included in
Table 40 Extrastate Wars.
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Chapter 4 - Regional Analysis
Empirical Results
To answer the question of what are the determinants of FDI in the units of
analysis, this study argues that FDI is moved by four classes of variables:
Macroeconomic, Government Performance, Country Risk, and War. Using a stepwise
regression method, one model of predictors was generated. Follows is a discussion of the
results in three parts. First, the validity of the findings is presented, addressing
autocorrelation and multicollinearity. Second, the correlations of the independent
variables with FDI are presented and discussed in relation to the hypotheses and the
overall theory. Third, the results of the stepwise regression are presented and discussed
in relation to the hypotheses and the overall theory. Last, the overall theoretical
significance of the R-square and selected predictors are discussed, comparisons are made
to the existing literature, and conclusions are drawn.
As discussed in the variables section, above, this study employs four variables
that may be susceptible to first-order autocorrelation. They are the dependent variable
FDI, the macroeconomic variables GDP Growth Rate and Openness, and the political
variable of Relative Political Extraction. The test employed for autocorrelation was the
Durbin Watson significance statistic. Here, n = 197 and the Durbin Watson statistic is
1.540. Using the Savin and White (1977) tables for models where n = 150 and there are 7
regressors plus an intercept term, the upper bound (dU) is 1.722 and the lower bound
(dL) is 1.530. The observed value is not less than the dL nor is higher than dU, and
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therefore the test for autocorrelation is inconclusive. However, because the observed
value is so close to the dL it is necessary to consider the bounds where n = 200. There,
the dL is 1.603, and dU is 1.746. Therefore, while the null hypothesis cannot be
categorically rejected, there is a possibility that there is first-order autocorrelation.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. For the predictive model generated for the regional analysis, the
tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a concern, as were the
VIFs (see Table 2 Regional Analysis Coefficients).
While the stepwise regression model isolates those variables that most explain the
FDI flows over time, an analysis of the correlations gives further insight into the
dynamics surrounding FDI flows in this region. Follows is a discussion of the positive
and negative correlations with attention paid to historical occurrences in the political
economy of the region. For a full table of the correlations, see Table 3 Regional Analysis
Pearson Correlation Coefficients.
As expected in this study's general theory, variances in FDI occurred in the
presence of macroeconomic, government performance, country risk, and war. Variables
that correlated positively with FDI, in order of classification, were GDP Growth (.102),
Openness (.332), Government Performance (RPE) (.096), Country Risk (.129), and
Intrastate War (.010). Openness was significant at 1%, and Country Risk was significant
at 5%. Of these results two seem to stand out but only one is surprising. Country Risk
correlates positively with FDI because the higher a country's score, the lesser the degree
of risk; thus, positive fluctuations in Country Risk can be expected with positive
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fluctuations in FDI. Consistent with Hypothesis Two, Openness correlates positively
with FDI.
Consistent with Hypothesis Three, Government Performance measured by RPE
correlates positively with FDI. This study uses the new measurement of RPE that does
not account for level of development or resource endowment. Whereas in other studies
of government performance level of development is considered to be an intervening
variable in the ability of countries to accomplish stated goals, the present study uses an
agricultural control variable in order to compare countries side by side and with a
parsimonious measure. This study draws on the following elaboration of the theory as
proposed by Feng and Chen (1997). Feng and Chen proposed that, whatever the level of
political capacity achieved, governments that increase or reduce political competency, or
that continually vacillate between being a strong and a weak government, induce
economic uncertainty, compared to governments whose political capacity is stable and
consistent (1997, 98 - 99). Consequently whether weak or strong there is less political
uncertainty with a government of stable political capacity than with a government whose
political capacity varies. Such variation affects investment. Typically, an individual’s
decision to invest is based on two concerns: expected returns and variance of returns. If
the level of return is kept constant, an increase in the level of the variance of returns will
decrease the expected utility of the investment, assuming the commonality of riskaversion among investors. Political uncertainty, caused by the high variability of political
capacity, increases the variance of the returns and thereby decreases the value of the
investment (Feng and Chen 1997, 99). Thus, the positive correlation of RPE with FDI
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lends additional support to Feng and Chen's (1997) findings with the caveat that it still
needs to be determined at the aggregate regional level or country level whether or not the
attraction of FDI is a national goal which, if it is, can be supported by a higher degree of
RPE.
The surprising positive correlation is that of Intrastate War. Follows is a
discussion of what may explain this result and why it conflicts with this study's
hypothesis. Hypothesis Five of this study states, "Investors are wary of an environment
where conflict is present as it suggests an unstable environment for business. This
suggests that War negatively correlates with FDI." Why Intrastate War correlates
positively with FDI can be explained by addressing its frequency and context. First, there
were four occurrences of Intrastate War during the time frame of this study (see ).
Second, the occurrences were in only two countries - Iraq (1996) and Pakistan (2004,
2005, and 2006). In Iraq the conflict was the Sixth Iraqi Kurds conflict between the Iraqi
government and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) which was a relatively shortlived conflict over local issues (August 31, 1996 - October 23, 1996) that resulted in a
stalemate. The amount of deaths is unknown. In this instance it can be argued that due to
the isolated nature of this conflict it had little effect on FDI flows in either Iraq or enough
to impact the region. In Pakistan the Intrastate Wars from 2004 - 2006 were a civil war
over local issues between the Pakistani government and the Waziri Tribes resulting in
approximately 3000 deaths. Due to the isolated nature of the Waziri tribal lands and their
low economic importance it can be argued that the conflict had little spillover effects and
was of small concern to investors. Furthermore, in neither Iraq nor Pakistan (as discussed
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below in the country sub-analyses) did Intrastate War emerge as a predictor of FDI flows.
Thus, what might explain the positive correlation with Intrastate War? Intrastate War
could simply have been too infrequent and isolated in nature to have a negative effect on
FDI.
Consistent with Hypothesis Five, Interstate War (-.069) and Extrastate War (.018) both correlated negatively with FDI at the regional level suggesting that where
Interstate and Extrastate War is present there is a negative influence on FDI flows over
time.
The stepwise regression generated one model of predictors, selecting all seven
variables and producing a R Square of .209 (see Table 2 Regional Analysis Coefficients).
The model representing this relationship is as follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Extrastate War) + β2 (Intrastate War) + β3 (GDP Growth) + β4
(RPE) + β5 (Country Risk) + β6 (Interstate War) + β7 (Openness)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
This study theorizes that all four classes of variable - macroeconomic,
government performance, country risk, and war - explain variance in FDI flows over
time. The results of the stepwise regression confirm the theory and are discussed in
greater detail below.
Conclusions of Regional Analysis
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Consistent with this study's theory, the stepwise regression produced a model that
is composed of multiple variables from four un-weighted classes and explains twenty
percent of the variance in FDI. Openness, Country Risk, and GDP Growth were
correlated most strongly with FDI flows over time, but Openness was three times
positively correlated with FDI than the other variables.
The story of macroeconomics in the region for the period under study is that
strong trade flows (Openness) are the best indicator of FDI flows over time. This result
confirms the first and second hypotheses of this study: if a country has a high amount of
Openness there may or may not be a positive relationship with FDI, and if a country
experiences GDP growth over time, then FDI will increase. Unlike Coan and Kugler's
study (2008), the present study argues that GDP Growth is but one of seven factors, each
in a different class, that move FDI. While GDP Growth and Government Performance
are conceptually and empirically important to FDI flows, they work in conjunction with
other factors to produce FDI. Nonetheless, the present study supports Coan and Kugler's
findings that macroeconomic factors are strong determinants of FDI flows.
Second, the story of Government Performance dynamics in the region for the
period under study is that governments that are the most efficient at extracting resources
from the population to further national goals represent a climate for positive FDI flows
over time thus confirming numerous prior studies (Adji, Ahn, and Holsey 1997;
Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Leblang 1997). Whereas Adji et al.'s (1997) study analyzed
the effects of macroeconomic conditions and political environment on direct foreign
investment using pooled cross-sectional, time-series data for 23 developing countries
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over the years 1970-1981, the present study uses a different time-series data set (1993 2007) that includes countries at different levels of development and employs the updated
RPE measure with the agricultural control. Similar to Leblang (1997) the results of the
present study suggest that there is a positive relationship between FDI and government
performance.
Third, the stability and high positive score of a country's investment climate
(Country Risk) correlates positively with FDI flows over time. This finding confirms
Hypothesis 4 that states that "if a country has a high degree of risk then it will have a low
amount of FDI, similarly if a country has a low degree of political risk then it will have a
higher relative amount of FDI." This suggests that a higher amount of Country Risk will
correlate negatively with FDI, and a lower amount of Country Risk will correlate
positively with FDI. This study approaches the issue of Country Risk assessment from a
slightly different angle than some of the literature, discussed further, below.
While questionnaires of investor opinion as to country risk have been employed
as a way of determining risk and thereby determining a country's fitness for FDI
(Biglaiser and Staats 2010, 508) there are methods that more closely comport with the
conceptualization used in the present study. This study agrees with Jensen and Young
that an appropriate mechanism linking violence to investment is investor perceptions of
risk, in which forward-looking investors attempt to predict the likelihood of future
political violence (Jensen and Young 2008). Furthermore, the present study agrees with
them in that there is growing consensus that political risk is an important factor that
greatly reduces the attractiveness of a foreign market for multinationals (Alfaro, Kalemli45

Ozca, and Volovych 2005) and can alter a firm's entry strategy (Heinsz 2002). These
risks range from the nationalization of industries (e.g., Cuba and Iran), to the canceling of
contracts (India and the Philippines), restrictions on the repatriating of capital (Argentina
and Malaysia), or political violence and war (Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Liberia). As with any other risk, the hesitancy of investors increases as the
likelihood that political risks will materialize increases (Jensen and Young 2008, 529).
They argue, however, that the way to accurately capture how risk is assessed in
investment decision making is through the use of data on the price paid by investors to
purchase risk insurance coverage. Jensen and Young (2008, 528) propose that the risk of
violence is an important part of a measure of country risk and should be included in any
assessment thereof.

Their central theoretical aim is to explain the factors that shape

investor perceptions of risk, and by using this measure they argue that their findings
speak directly to the risk calculus (Jensen and Young 2008, 528).
This study uses information that investment firms and market watchers consider
useful to their colleagues and the institutions they either represent or are familiar with.
However, the present study uses a stronger measure of gauging investor temperament for
FDI decision-making by employing the Euromoney Country Risk rankings, the
methodology of which is both quantitative and qualitative, which yields stronger
explanatory results.
A further difference between the present study and the literature is that Jensen and
Young (Jensen and Young 2008) use risk as the dependent variable, whereas the present
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study employs risk as an independent variable. In that regard, this study is similar to
others that use FDI as a dependent variable that is moved by risk.
The Young and Jensen (2008) study's use of a risk measure that incorporates
violence is also conceptually problematic for the present study. The present study
employs the Euromoney measure as it does not include violence, political instability, or
war as a factor in country risk. Since the present study employs three separate measures
of war, it avoids any problems with endogeneity that could arise if it were to employ a
measure of risk that uses violence and war as one of several indicators making up the
overall score of risk. Furthermore, Euromoney takes into account non-repatriation of
capital. The issue here is that Euromoney measures Country Risk, and not the risk of
violence. Thus the methodology is more germane to studying the effects on a dependent
variable of FDI because the use of a country/political risk measure is based more on
macroeconomic and political factors, and the use of Correlates of War measures is a
direct measure of violence.
Fourth, the story of the effects of war on FDI flows over time is both expected
and unexpected. As the correlations discussed above demonstrate, Interstate and
Extrastate War had negative relationships with FDI flows but Intrastate War had a
positive relationship. From a comparativist perspective this makes sense insofar as the
Intrastate Wars examined coincided with an influx of foreign troops during the
insurgency and the establishment of bases that were followed by an increase of foreign
firms. To that end, Biglaiser and DeRouen have demonstrated that since the start of the
Iraq war, FDI has flowed into Iraq. Among the top five countries investing in Iraq since
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2002, United States firms have by far the largest number of FDI projects (fifteen),
followed by Egypt (three), and Germany, Jordan, and Kuwait (two each). Pentagon
contracts awarded almost exclusively to U.S. corporations are partly responsible for the
significant U.S. inflows (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007, 835).
Overall Conclusions as to the Efficacy of the Model Presented
It can be concluded that the low R square of the study at the regional level can be
attributed to a lack of consistency between all the countries in the group defined as the
Middle East Region. The strengths of this study's methodology - a large n, a time series
that captures a range of dynamics thereby avoiding selection bias, a large amount of
variance in data, a Durbin Watson score that demonstrates a low chance of serial
correlation, different types of regimes, the presence or absence of conflict - support the
theory that FDI is moved by a variety of factors, and that one or two variables cannot
accurately account for FDI flows over time. Most importantly, as will be demonstrated in
the country level sub-analyses, below, the theory has a high explanatory yield at the
country level. It makes empirical sense that the model yields a low R square at the
regional level because of the variability of country dynamics. In the sub-analysis that
follows, the model's utility is demonstrated in further refuting some assumptions that may
attend a passing glance at a country.
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Chapter 5 - Country Level Analysis
Introduction to Country Level Analysis
This study argues that yearly flows of FDI (% of GDP) are moved by four classes
of variables: Macroeconomic, Government Performance, Country Risk, and War.
Country sub-analysis was performed in order to illustrate to what extent the country with
the highest net change of FDI was affected by the independent variables and the extent to
which the countries most representative of each independent variable were affected by
that particular independent variable. Then the country results were compared to the
regional analysis results. This was done in order to compare the regional aggregate
effects of the independent variables on FDI with those countries for which it would be
expected that the independent variable that most strongly impacts them compared to the
countries as a whole, in order to determine whether or not the effect is any different from
that at the regional level. Furthermore, it is important that the hypotheses formulated for
each independent variable be tested in their most extreme quantification, vis-à-vis the
aggregate.
The criteria for country selection were operationalized as follows. The subject of
this study is the macroeconomic and political determinants of FDI over time. Therefore,
for the dependent and independent variables where growth was a factor or where serial
correlation may be present (FDI, GDP Growth, and Openness), and for which a net
change over time was theoretically observable, the standard calculation for economic
growth was employed to determine the rankings of each country, computed as follows:
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PR = (VPresent - VPast) / VPast x 100
Where:
PR = Percent Rate
VPresent = Present or Future Value
VPast = Past or Present Value
The calculation for determining the ranking for the country representing
Government Performance is based on the theoretical platform that investors are attracted
to countries where there is both a high level of government performance and consistent
and stable performance over time. Therefore, the countries were ranked by median RPE
and standard deviation. Thus, the country with the highest median and lowest standard
deviation of RPE was the selected country.
The country with the lowest level of Country Risk was selected as follows. For
any given year a country has a Country Risk score, independent of other countries, based
on a hundred-point scale. To determine the country with the lowest risk (highest score)
the country with the highest median was selected. Similarly, the country with the highest
risk (lowest score) was determined by which country had the lowest median score.
The countries representing Interstate, Intrastate, and Extrastate War were based on
the sum of their dummy variables. Thus, for any given year a country had either a 1 or a
0 for the occurrence or non-occurrence of any one of the three types of war. The country
with the highest aggregate score for the time period was considered the representative
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country for that type of war. Thus, for Interstate War Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey each
scored 1. In Intrastate War Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey scored 1, 2, and 0, respectively. In
Extrastate War, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey scored 5,4, and 1, respectively. Therefore, for
Intrastate War Pakistan was selected, and for Extrastate War Iraq was selected. In the
case of Interstate War all countries eligible for sub-analysis - Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey had a score of 1. Each of these countries appeared in sub-analyses for other variables
and therefore no separate sub-analysis based solely on Interstate War was done. Instead,
in addition to the focus variable special attention also was paid to Interstate War.
Turkey Sub-Analysis: Greatest Net Change in Foreign Direct Investment
In this sub-analysis, it is hypothesized that the positive correlations and predictors
for FDI in the regional model will be as high, if not higher, at the country level. In order
to determine the country with the greatest net change in FDI over the period of 1993 2007, a standard economic growth calculation was used to determine net growth for each
country and then the median of the aggregate of all countries. Turkey experienced the
largest net growth in FDI as a percentage of GDP at 866%, compared to a median of
476% for the aggregate of countries during the same period. Note that Iraq experienced a
net growth of FDI as a percentage of GDP of 1529 %. However, Iraq had an n = 10,
whereas for all other countries n = 15. FDI was present in Iraq from 1997 - 2002, and
2004 - 2007. For the years 1993 - 1996 and 2003 FDI was 0. Therefore, the selection of
Turkey was made for two reasons. First, including a country with a different n than other
countries greatly skews the result. Second, if Iraq's net growth of FDI to be calculated
using the standard economic growth model for the years 1997 - 2007 it would not capture
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the effect of a jump from zero to any percentage of GDP. To that end Turkey was
selected as the country with the greatest net change in FDI and the one that is suitable to
test the overall conclusions of the regional model with no particular attention paid to the
effects of any one independent variable. Furthermore, Turkey is an interesting point of
analysis due to its many political and economic reforms during the period of this study
and can offer some interesting observations about FDI in these circumstances that are not
measured directly or indirectly by any of the independent variables (thus avoiding any
problems of endogeneity in the analysis).
The test employed for autocorrelation was the Durbin-Watson significance
statistic.

Here, n = 15 and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.607. Using the Savin and

White (1977) tables for models with seven regressors, an intercept term and where n =
15, the lower bound (dL) is .226 and the upper bound (dU) is 2.530. The observed value
falls directly between the dL and dU and the presence of autocorrelation is inclusive.
However, to be conservative in the estimation, the null-hypothesis of zero autocorrelation
cannot be rejected.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. Here, for the predictive models generated for the Turkey analysis,
the range of the tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a
concern, as were the ranges of VIFs. Test results for Turkey are found in Table 4 Turkey
Analysis Coefficients.
Compared to the correlations at the regional level, the results for Turkey were
consistent (see Table 5 Turkey Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients). Of the
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variables, only GDP Growth (0.052), Openness (0.552), and Country Risk (0.111) were
positive. Openness was significant at 5% and was consistent with the regional dynamic
of Openness being the strongest correlation with FDI.
Variables that had a negative correlation were RPE (-0.262), Interstate War (0.185), and Extrastate War (-0.155). There were no occurrences of Intrastate War.
The stepwise regression of the seven independent variables used in this study
against the dependent variable of FDI yielded an R square of .821 (see Table 4 Turkey
Analysis Coefficients), with Extrastate War, Country Risk, Interstate War, GDP Growth,
Openness, and RPE being selected as the predictors. The model representing this
relationship is as follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Extrastate War) + β2 (Country Risk) + β3 (Openness) + β4 (GDP
Growth) + β5 (RPE)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of the Turkey Analysis
A comparison of the Regional analysis with the Turkey analysis shows that the
Turkey analysis had the same signs and all hypotheses were confirmed (see Table 6
Region vs. Turkey Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison). Additionally,
Openness had the highest correlation with FDI and was the most significant variable at
5%. The results for Turkey support the overall theory. The selection of all classes of
predictors is what one might intuitively expect as indicators of FDI and reflects the
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regional analysis findings (see Table 7 Region vs. Turkey Selected Model Predictors
Comparison).
In the case of Interstate War, qualitatively, before any analysis need be done, it
could be predicted that the Interstate War variable in the analysis of Turkey would have
little to no significance, correlation, or emerge as a predictor of FDI. The Interstate War
in which Turkey was involved was the War for Kosovo in 1993 which lasted just 7
months and in which Turkey played a supportive role as an ally of NATO forces. Even
though it was a war fought outside its borders, and in which Turkey incurred no
battlefield deaths it nonetheless had a negative correlation with FDI flows.
Saudi Arabia Sub-Analysis: Greatest Net Change in GDP Growth
This study hypothesizes that GDP Growth Rate will have a positive effect on FDI.
If this is the case, then among all the countries under analysis it can be expected that the
country with the greatest net change in GDP Growth will demonstrate the highest
positive correlation to FDI compared to the regional aggregate.
In order to determine the country with the greatest net change in GDP Growth for
the period of 1993 - 2007, a standard economic growth calculation was used to determine
the net GDP Growth for each country and then the region. Saudi Arabia is the country
among the selection group that demonstrated the highest net change in GDP Growth at
7638%, compared to a regional median of 11%.
The test employed for autocorrelation was the Durbin Watson significance
statistic.

Here, n = 15 and the Durbin Watson statistic is 1.605. Using the Savin and
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White (1977) tables for models with seven regressors, an intercept term, and where n =
15 the lower bound (dL) is .226 and the upper bound (dU) is 2.530. The observed value
falls directly between the dL and dU and the presence of autocorrelation is inconclusive.
However, to be conservative in the estimation, the null-hypothesis of zero autocorrelation
cannot be rejected.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. Here, for the predictive models generated for the Saudi Arabia
analysis, the tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a
concern, as were the VIFs. Test results for the Saudi Arabia Sub-Analysis are in Table 8
Saudi Arabia Analysis Coefficients.
While the stepwise regression model isolates those variables that most explain the
FDI flows over time and can demonstrate whether or not the overall theory is supported,
an analysis of the correlations provides initial insight into the dynamics surrounding FDI
flows in Saudi Arabia and a better indicator of support for this study's hypotheses. In
particular, since Saudi Arabia had highest net change in GDP Growth at 7638%,
compared to a regional median of 11%, this sub-analysis is concerned with Hypothesis
One: "If a country experiences GDP growth over time, then FDI will increase. This
suggests that there will be a positive correlation between GDP growth and FDI over
time."
The analysis for Saudi Arabia GDP Growth correlated at 0.124 with FDI and
Openness correlated at 0.729 and was significant at 1% with FDI, confirming Hypotheses
One and Two (see Table 9 Saudi Arabia Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients).
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However, contrary to this study's Hypotheses Three and Four, Saudi Arabia saw a
negative correlation with Government Performance (measured by RPE) (-0.215) and a
low amount Country Risk (-0.070). Compared to the Pearson Correlation Coefficients at
the regional level, the correlations for Saudi Arabia were inconsistent (see Table 10
Region vs. Saudi Arabia Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison). While GDP
Growth and Openness had the expected sign, RPE and Country Risk did not.
The stepwise regression of the seven independent variables used in this study
against the dependent variable of FDI yielded an R square of 0.567 (see Table 8 Saudi
Arabia Analysis Coefficients), with Country Risk, Openness, RPE, and GDP Growth
being selected as the predictors. The model representing this relationship is as follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Country Risk) + β2 (Openness) + β3 (RPE) + β4 (GDP Growth)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of Saudi Arabia Analysis
The results of the stepwise regression confirm the general theory that FDI flows
over time are moved by all classes of variables that are present (in this case
Macroeconomic, Government Performance, and Country Risk). War as a fourth class
was not present in the data and thus is moot as a class of variable. Additionally, the
predictors selected in the model for Saudi Arabia were consistent with the Regional
analysis and further confirmed the theory (see Table 11 Region vs. Saudi Arabia Selected
Model Predictors Comparison). The results of the analysis for Saudi Arabia are clear. A
country with high GDP Growth cannot rely on that for attraction of FDI. Consistent with
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Hypothesis One, the country with the highest GDP Growth saw a positive correlation of
GDP Growth with FDI. However, of the two positively correlated variables (Openness
and GDP Growth) Openness correlated more highly with FDI flows. In fact, Openness
was significant at 1%, thus lending very strong support to Hypothesis Two: "If a country
has a high amount of Openness we can expect that there will be a positive relationship
with FDI." This suggests that a country's favorable policies to the ingress and egress of
trade can result in FDI. Last, Country Risk was not altogether surprisingly correlated
negatively with FDI (recall that a higher score equals favorable country conditions). This
could be due in part to its median score of 64.68 out of 100 which reflects
macroeconomic factors such as debt service or repatriation of capital that are not fully
captured by the GDP Growth Rate or Openness.
The high correlation of Openness demonstrates that FDI in this case was more
affected by the macroeconomics of trade posture as measured by Openness than it was
the rate of GDP Growth. Thus, even a country's relative higher GDP Growth cannot be
counted on to be an indicator of its overall suitability as a place for FDI. The importance
of Openness (its ratio of exports and imports to GDP) suggests that some combination of
political and policy decisions and trade flows, undetectable by this analysis, explained the
variance in FDI flows over time.
Unlike Coan and Kugler's study (2008), the present study argues that GDP
Growth is but one of seven factors in different classes that move FDI. However, this
study agrees with Coan and Kugler (2008) that economic indicators are strong predictors
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of FDI flows. While GDP Growth and RPE are conceptually and empirically important
to FDI flows, they work in conjunction with other factors to produce FDI.
Iraq Sub-Analysis: Highest Net Change in Openness, Highest Level of Country Risk, and
Most Occurrences of Extrastate War
As noted above, in this study countries have been selected for sub-analysis based
on whether or not they have the highest median of some variables or highest occurrence
of other variables. Iraq has had the highest net change in Openness, the lowest median
score of Country Risk, and the most occurrences of Extrastate War. Therefore, this
section of the sub-analysis will discuss each of these exemplar variables in turn rather
than in sections unto themselves.
This study hypothesizes that Openness will have a positive effect on FDI. If this
is the case, then among all the countries under analysis it can be expected that the
Openness score of Iraq will correlate highly with FDI. Furthermore, this study argues
that it is a combination of five classes of variables that move FDI, therefore it can be
expected that Openness - a hypothesized macroeconomic indicator - will, either with or
without the other macroeconomic indicator of GDP Growth, emerge as a predictor of FDI
in the stepwise regression.
In order to determine the country with the greatest net change in Openness for the
period of 1993 - 2007, a standard economic growth calculation was used to determine the
net Openness change for each country and then the region. Iraq is the country among the
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selection group that demonstrated the highest net change in Openness at 89%, compared
to a regional median of 20%.
In order to determine the country with the highest amount of Country Risk, the
country with the lowest median score on a 100-point scale for the time period was
selected. Iraq had the lowest median score at 4.96, compared to a regional median at
59.12.
In order to determine the country with the most incidents of Extrastate War for the
time period of 1993 - 2007, the country with the greatest sum of Extrastate Wars for the
time period was selected. Iraq had five incidents of Extrastate War (Israel had the
second-most incidents with four) and is thus selected as the subject of this sub-analysis.
As discussed in the variables section, above, this study employs four variables
that may be susceptible to first-order autocorrelation. They are the dependent variable
FDI, the macroeconomic variables of GDP Growth Rate and Openness, and the political
variable of Government Performance measured by Relative Political Extraction. The test
employed for autocorrelation was the Durbin Watson significance statistic.

Here, n = 10

and the Durbin Watson statistic is 2.885. Using the Savin and White (1977) tables for
models with seven regressors, an intercept term, and where n = 10, there is no tabled
lower or upper bound. However, by following the accepted rules for determining the
presence of autocorrelation, since the Durbin Watson statistic is approaching 4, it can be
stated that there is negative autocorrelation. Therefore, the null-hypothesis of zero
autocorrelation cannot be rejected.
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Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. Here, for the predictive models generated for the Iraq analysis, the
tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a concern, as were the
VIFs. Test results for Iraq are found in Table 12 Iraq Analysis Coefficients.
While the stepwise regression model isolates those variables that most explain the
FDI flows over time and can demonstrate whether or not the overall theory is supported,
an analysis of the correlations provides initial insight into the dynamics surrounding FDI
flows in Iraq and a better indicator of support for this study's hypotheses regarding
Openness, High Country Risk, and Presence of Extrastate War. Follows is a discussion
of these correlations, found in Table 13 Iraq Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients.
The variables negatively correlated with FDI were Openness (-0.515), RPE (0.781), and High Country Risk (-0.113). Thus, contrary to Hypothesis Two, Openness
correlated negatively and was inconsistent with the regional results. Furthermore,
contrary to Hypothesis Three RPE was negative and this result was significant at 1%, the
results of which are discussed further, below.
Compared to the stepwise regression at the regional level, the findings for Iraq as
the country with the highest net change in Openness, High Country Risk, and Presence of
Extrastate War were inconsistent. Of these three variables of focus, two had the opposite
expected sign. Only GDP Growth at 0.215 was positively correlated as expected in
Hypothesis One. Even more surprisingly, Extrastate War, contrary to Hypothesis Five,
was positively correlated with FDI at 0.778 (see Table 14 Region vs. Iraq Pearson
Correlation Coefficients Comparison).
60

The stepwise regression of the seven independent variables used in this study
against the dependent variable of FDI yielded an R square of 0.919 (see Table 12 Iraq
Analysis Coefficients), with Extrastate War, Country Risk, Openness, GDP Growth,
RPE, and Interstate War being selected as the predictors. The model representing this
relationship is as follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Extrastate War) + β2 (Country Risk) + β3 (Openness) + β4 (GDP
Growth) + β5 (RPE) + β6 (Interstate War)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of Iraq Analysis
In comparison with the Regional Model, the correlations were significantly
different but the classes of predictors selected were the same (see Table 14 Region vs.
Iraq Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison and Table 15 Region vs. Iraq Selected
Model Predictors Comparison). Iraq's results supported the overall theory of FDI being
moved by multiple classes of variables, but it did not lend support to the second
hypothesis. In Hypothesis Two it was expected that Openness would positively correlate
with FDI. On the contrary, Iraq's overwhelmingly high increase in Openness compared
to the other countries did not result in a positive correlation with FDI.
Results for Country Risk were more in line with Hypothesis Four. Country Risk
directly affects returns on investment, cost of business, and the repatriation of capital. If
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a country has a high degree of risk then it will have a low amount of FDI. This suggests
that Country Risk will correlate negatively with FDI.
Iraq, with the highest median Country Risk over time, demonstrated a negative
correlation with FDI. Unsurprisingly, Interstate War corresponded negatively with FDI,
thus affirming Hypothesis Five.
The strong negative correlation of RPE with FDI - significant at 1% - soundly
supports Hypothesis Three that states: "Since FDI attraction may or may not be a national
goal, it is unpredictable whether or not there is a positive correlation of RPE with FDI.
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between RPE and FDI."
Of most interest is the seemingly improbable positive correlation of Extrastate
War with FDI. Extrastate War is a direct measure of war with significant deaths and
casualties between states and non-state combatants where the borders and limits of
conflict are unclear. Investors are wary of an environment where conflict is present as it
suggests an unstable environment for business. If Extrastate War is present then FDI will
remain static or decrease over time. This suggests that Interstate War negatively
correlates with FDI. However, this result can be reconciled with the end of the Invasion
of Iraq and the beginning of the Iraqi Resistance both in 2003. As the center of the
country came under more control of the United States and its allied forces in 2003 at the
conclusion of the Iraq Invasion, capital begin to flow in via contractors and
multinationals. At the same time the Iraqi Resistance began. Thus, it is doubtful that
Extrastate War is a precondition or indicator for potential or contemporary FDI in Iraq,
but rather a coincidence of one war ending and an occupation and insurgency beginning.
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Israel Sub-Analysis: Highest Median Government Performance with the Lowest Standard
Deviation of Government Performance
A country's Government Performance - measured by RPE - is its ability to extract
resources from the population to further the pursuit of national goals. It is a measure of
the ratio of tax to GDP and is not dependent on its relative size of GDP ppp to other
countries. In this sub-analysis Hypothesis Four is tested: "Since FDI attraction may or
may not be a national goal, it is unpredictable whether or not there is a positive
correlation of RPE with FDI. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between
RPE and FDI."
This study is predicated on the theory that investors prefer stability and
predictability in markets for investment. While effective governance is preferable o
ineffective or non-existent governance, stability and predictability offer parameters to
make informed decisions. An assessment of RPE can provide us with a better
understanding of a region that is dynamic and has great global significance due to its
proximity to energy reserves, the colonial legacy, and its susceptibility to foreign military
interventions and wars. The utility of Kugler at al.'s (2012) measure is that it has allowed
scholars to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of governments vertically and
horizontally - from the international to sub national levels. As such it may have a strong
utility in forecasting and assessing the fluctuations of a state's FDI and their attendant
economic and human development.
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Keeping this in mind, the country that typified RPE in the mind of the investor
was the one with both the highest median RPE (indicating more effective governance)
and the lowest standard deviation (indicating stability and predictability). For the period
of 1993 - 2007 Israel had the highest median RPE at 1.45, compared to a regional median
of 0.67, and the lowest standard deviation of 0.08, compared to a regional standard
deviation of 0.12.
The test employed for autocorrelation was the Durbin Watson significance
statistic.

Here, n = 15 and the Durbin Watson statistic is 2.216. Using the Savin and

White (1977) tables for models with seven regressors, an intercept term and where n =
15, the lower bound (dL) is .226 and the upper bound (dU) is 2.530. The observed value
falls directly between the dL and dU and the presence of autocorrelation is inclusive.
However, to be conservative in the estimation, the null-hypothesis of zero autocorrelation
cannot be rejected.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. Here, for the predictive models generated for the Israel analysis,
the tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a concern, as were
the VIFs. Test results for Israel are found in Table 16 Israel Analysis Coefficients.
While the stepwise regression model isolates those variables that most explain the
FDI flows over time and can demonstrate whether or not the overall theory is supported,
an analysis of the correlations provides initial insight into the dynamics surrounding FDI
flows in Israel and a better indicator of support for this study's hypothesis regarding
Government Performance (measured by RPE).
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The correlations for Israel (see Table 17 Israel Analysis Pearson Correlation
Coefficients) confirm Hypothesis Four: "Since FDI attraction may or may not be a
national goal, it is unpredictable whether or not there is a positive correlation of RPE with
FDI. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between RPE and FDI." RPE
correlated negatively with FDI (RPE at -.0413) and was significant at 1%. However,
Extrastate War also correlated positively with FDI at 0.026. Compared to the
correlations at the regional level, the findings for Israel as the country with the highest
median RPE, and the lowest standard deviation of RPE were inconsistent with the
regional results. The macroeconomic (GDP Growth at 0.312, Openness at 0.708), and
Country Risk (Country Risk at 0.066) variables performed positively as expected (see
Table 18 Region vs. Israel Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison).
The stepwise regression of the eight independent variables used in this study
against the dependent variable of FDI yielded an R square of 0.758 (see Table 16 Israel
Analysis Coefficients), with Extrastate War, Country Risk, Openness, GDP Growth, and
RPE being selected as the predictors. The model representing this relationship is as
follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Extrastate War) + β2 (Country Risk) + β3 (Openness) + β4 (GDP
Growth) + β5 (RPE)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of the Israel Analysis
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Compared to the stepwise regression at the regional level, all classes of predictors
were selected and Israel's model supports the overall theory (see Table 19 Region vs.
Israel Selected Model Predictors Comparison). Consistent with the regional analysis,
Openness in Israel had the highest correlation with FDI. This suggests that perhaps
observed trade flows and immeasurable policy factors are accounting for the most
variance in FDI over time. The Israel model lends strong support to the dependent nature
of RPE noted in Hypothesis Three. While RPE can facilitate FDI, RPE can only be a
determinant of FDI if the target country has a policy of attracting FDI. This suggests that
during the time period of analysis Israel did not have a strong policy of attracting FDI, a
policy that cannot be measured or captured by the present study.
Surprisingly, Extrastate War correlated positively with FDI. This could be
because the conflict, the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000 -2003 was won by Israel and Israel
during that time, due to its high RPE and standing with the West (in particular the United
States) was still able to attract FDI and sustain its economic growth.
United Arab Emirates Sub-Analysis: Lowest Level of Country Risk
Country Risk directly affects returns on investment, cost of business, and the
repatriation of capital. If a country has a high degree of risk then it will have a low
amount of FDI, similarly if a country has a low degree of country risk then it will have a
higher relative amount of FDI. This suggests that a higher amount of Country Risk will
correlate negatively with FDI, and a lower amount of Country Risk will correlate
positively with FDI.
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In order to determine the country with the lowest amount of Country Risk, the
country with the highest median score on a 100-point scale for the time period was
selected. The United Arab Emirates had the highest median score at 74.68, compared to a
regional median at 59.12.
The test employed for autocorrelation was the Durbin Watson significance
statistic.

Here, n = 15 and the Durbin Watson statistic is 1.867. Using the Savin and

White (1977) tables for models with seven regressors, an intercept term and where n =
15, the lower bound (dL) is .226 and the upper bound (dU) is 2.530. The observed value
falls directly between the dL and dU and the presence of autocorrelation is inclusive.
However, to be conservative in the estimation, the null-hypothesis of zero autocorrelation
cannot be rejected.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. Here, for the predictive models generated for the U.A.E. analysis,
the tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a concern, as were
the VIFs. Test results can be found in Table 20 United Arab Emirates Analysis
Coefficients.
While the stepwise regression model isolates those variables that most explain the
FDI flows over time and can demonstrate whether or not the overall theory is supported,
an analysis of the correlations provides initial insight into the dynamics surrounding FDI
flows in the United Arab Emirates and a better indicator of support for this study's Fourth
Hypothesis regarding Low Levels of Country Risk.
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In the United Arab Emirates analysis all variables had the predicted sign and
correlated with FDI as follows: GDP Growth 0.284, Openness 0.723, RPE 0.476, and
Country Risk 0.191 (recall that a positive correlation of Country Risk with FDI is an
indicator of low risk) (see Table 21 United Arab Emirates Analysis Pearson Correlation
Coefficients). Most notably, RPE was significant at 5% and Openness was significant at
1%. As there were no incidents of War there were no correlations and thus the predicted
outcome of negative correlations of War with FDI is moot. Compared to the correlations
at the regional level, the correlations for the United Arab Emirates were consistent with
the general model and all variables had the same sign and Openness was significant at
1% (see Table 22 Region vs. United Arab Emirates Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Comparison).
The stepwise regression of the eight independent variables used in this study
against the dependent variable of FDI yielded an R square of 0.846, with Country Risk,
Openness, RPE, and GDP Growth being selected as the predictors (see Table 20 United
Arab Emirates Analysis Coefficients). The model representing this relationship is as
follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Country Risk) + β2 (Openness) + β3 (RPE) + β4 (GDP Growth)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of the United Arab Emirates
In the case of the U.A.E, the overall theory that FDI is moved by a combination of
all classes of variables for which data is available is supported. The selection of all
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classes of predictors is consistent with the Regional analysis and further confirms the
theory (see Table 23 Region vs. United Arab Emirates Selected Model Predictors
Comparison). Consistent with the region, Openness is one of the most significant
predictors of FDI - accounting for a large degree of the variance and correlating
positively. Additionally, the results lend support to Hypothesis Four's prediction that
where Country Risk is low, FDI will not be negatively affected.
Pakistan Sub-Analysis: Most Incidents of Intrastate War
Intrastate War is a direct measure of internal armed conflict with significant
deaths and casualties. Investors are wary of an environment where conflict is present as
it suggests an unstable environment for business. If Intrastate War is present then FDI
will remain static or decrease over time. This suggests that Intrastate War negatively
correlates with FDI.
In order to determine the country with the most incidents of Intrastate War for the
time period of 1993 - 2007, the country with the greatest sum of intrastate wars for the
time period was selected. Pakistan had three incidents of intrastate war (Iraq had the
second-most incidents with one) and is thus the subject of this sub-analysis. Those three
incidents were the Sixth Iraqi Kurds War of 1996 resulting in an indeterminate amount of
battlefield deaths, and the Waziristan conflicts between allied Pakistani and United States
forces, and the Waziristani tribes of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas near the
northern Pakistan - Afghanistan border between 2004 and 2006 (equaling 2 incidents)
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resulting in approximately 1200 Pakistani and U.S. battlefield deaths and 1800
Waziristani battlefield deaths.
The test employed for autocorrelation was the Durbin Watson significance
statistic.

Here, n = 15 and the Durbin Watson statistic is 1.347. Using the Savin and

White (Savin 1977) tables for models with seven regressors, an intercept term and where
n = 15, the lower bound (dL) is .226 and the upper bound (dU) is 2.530. The observed
value falls directly between the dL and dU and the presence of autocorrelation is
inclusive. However, to be conservative in the estimation, the null-hypothesis of zero
autocorrelation cannot be rejected.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. Here, for the predictive models generated for the Pakistan analysis,
the tolerance was well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a concern, as was the
VIF. The test results for Pakistan are found in Table 24 Pakistan Analysis Coefficients.
The positive correlations for Pakistan were inconsistent with the hypotheses of the
model (see Table 25 Pakistan Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients). GDP Growth
(0.527) and Openness (0.823) produced the predicted sign as did Interstate War (-0.135).
GDP Growth and Country Risk were significant at 5%, and Openness was significant at
1%. However, Intrastate War (0.437) and Country Risk (0.445) were unexpectedly
positively correlated. Although it is theoretically possible in this model for Country Risk
to correlate positively, in the case of Pakistan its median score was 35/100 placing it third
lowest of all the countries and 24 points below the group median. Variables that
correlated negatively with FDI were RPE (-0.476) and RPE was significant at 5%.
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Compared to the correlations at the regional level the results are not wholly inconsistent
with only RPE correlating negatively (see Table 26 Region vs. Pakistan Pearson
Correlation Coefficients Comparison).
The stepwise regression of the eight independent variables used in this study
against the dependent variable of FDI yielded an R square of .797, with Intrastate War,
Interstate War, Country Risk, Openness, GDP Growth, and RPE being selected as the
predictors (see Table 24 Pakistan Analysis Coefficients). The model representing this
relationship is as follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Intrastate War) + β2 (Interstate War) + β3 (Country Risk) + β4
(Openness) + β5 (GDP Growth) + β6 (RPE)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of the Pakistan Analysis
Compared to the regional analysis, all classes of variables were selected as
accounting for the variance in FDI flows over time and therefore the results of the
Pakistan model are consistent with, and lend additional support to, the overall theory (see
Table 27 Region vs. Pakistan Selected Model Predictors Comparison). Again, consistent
with the regional analysis results Openness correlated positively and emerged as the most
significant predictor of FDI flows over time.
These results seem to comport with Klasra's (2011) findings regarding FDI, trade
and openness. There it is argued that Pakistan and Turkey, since the 1980s, have been
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widely adopting reforms in their respective economies with the objective to set a good
pace of economic development. Until 1980 both countries were following importsubstitution policies and import restrictions were quite high. Starting her trade
liberalization during 1980s, Pakistan reduced tariff from 150 percent to zero percent until
1995, strengthened export incentive system and liberalized the import licensing system.
Out of 5,464 goods, only 70 goods were listed on import restriction list. All export duties
were removed with a few exceptions. Its export regime was liberalized to do away with
public sector monopolies to permit full private sector participation (Klasra 2011, 224).
Bahrain Sub-Analysis: Petroleum Dependent Country
The movers of FDI over time in Bahrain are of interest because of its status as a
country that is greatly dependent on petroleum for its GDP. To the hypothetical investor
the suitability of a petroleum dependent country with proven reserves and for who prices
are set by OPEC as a target country of FDI represents a quandary. Perhaps the same
movers of FDI for other countries do not apply to a country that derives most of its
revenue from domestic resources and has little to no incentive to attract FDI. To that end,
Bahrain will be analyzed in the same manner as the region, with no attention paid to any
one particular variable.
As in the regional analysis, the statistical process used for Bahrain was a stepwise
regression using the seven predictors. The test employed for autocorrelation was the
Durbin Watson significance statistic. Here, n = 15 and the Durbin Watson statistic is
1.948. Using the Savin and White (1977) tables for models with seven regressors, an
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intercept term and where n = 15, the lower bound (dL) is .226 and the upper bound (dU)
is 2.530. The observed value falls directly between the dL and dU and the presence of
autocorrelation is inconclusive. However, to be conservative in the estimation, the nullhypothesis of zero autocorrelation cannot be rejected. All war measures for Bahrain had
no correlations due to them being a non-event for the period under study.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) and tolerances. Here, for the predictive models generated for the Bahrain analysis,
the tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to be a concern, as were
the VIFs. The test results for Bahrain are listed in Table 28 Bahrain Analysis
Coefficients.
While the stepwise regression model isolates those variables that most explain the
variance of FDI flows over time and can demonstrate whether or not the overall theory is
supported, an analysis of the correlations provides initial insight into the dynamics
surrounding FDI flows in Bahrain and a better indicator of support for this study's
hypotheses.
As expected in this study's general theory, variances in FDI occurred in the
presence of macroeconomic, government performance, country risk (war was a nonoccurrence and so was not selected as a predictor). One variable correlated positively
with FDI: Openness at 0.261 (see Table 29 Bahrain Analysis Pearson Correlation
Coefficients). However, Openness was not significant at 5% and so cannot be considered
to have a high determinative effect on FDI. Nevertheless, Hypothesis Two is supported:
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"If a country has a high amount of Openness we can expect that there will be a positive
relationship with FDI."
Contrary to the majority of this study's hypotheses, Bahrain saw a negative
correlation with GDP Growth (-0.391), RPE (-0.352), and Country Risk (-0.423). There
is no support in the case of Bahrain for the hypotheses that GDP Growth, Government
Performance (as measured by RPE), and low Country Risk correlate with FDI flows.
Thus, Bahrain is inconsistent with the Regional analysis and had only one variable,
Openness, with the expected sign (see Table 30 Region vs. Bahrain Pearson Correlation
Coefficients Comparison). The negative correlation with Country Risk is surprising
because Bahrain had a median score of 64/100 (5 points above the group median), and
had the fifth highest score out of the fourteen (100 points being the best possible score
indicating lowest risk).
The stepwise regression generated one model and yielded an R square of 0.663,
with Country Risk, RPE, GDP Growth, and Openness being selected as the predictors
(see Table 28 Bahrain Analysis Coefficients). The model representing this relationship is
as follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Country Risk) + β2 (RPE) + β3 (GDP Growth) + β4 (Openness)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of Bahrain Analysis
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Compared to the stepwise regression at the regional level, the findings for Bahrain
were consistent. Since War was not present as a possible outcome for a predictor, the
overall theory that FDI flows are moved by Macroeconomic, Government Performance,
and Country Risk was confirmed (see Table 31 Region vs. Bahrain Selected Model
Predictors Comparison). However, unlike the regional level, GDP Growth, RPE, and
Country Risk are negatively correlated with FDI flows. Follows is a discussion of why
these three variables may be negatively correlated.
The Bahrain economy is dependent on large exports of petroleum. Additionally,
until recently most industry was state owned and it had a trade policy that discouraged,
and in some ways made impossible, FDI. Thus, its GDP Growth rate was moved by its
volume of petroleum exports and operated independently of other sources of economic
growth and capitalization by policy design. In much the same way, the negative
correlation of FDI with Country Risk occurs in the same way. Despite its very favorable
risk rating, a policy that prohibits outside investment will result in a dynamic that may
appear skewed when compared to other countries with more favorable policies toward
FDI. The contrast of its Country Risk rating to the regional model is similar in that
regard for two reasons. First, the majority of the countries under study are open to trade,
yielding an positive relationship with FDI. Second, outlier occurrences like those of
Bahrain are washed out by the aggregate of policies. The negative correlation of RPE
with FDI may be attributable to an economy that in many ways pays the polity a subsidy
and is not dependent on taxation of that polity to advance government goals. Simply,

75

where there is no tax base and all industry is state-owned it will follow that RPE will be
low.
Iran Sub-Analysis: Country of General Interest
The movers of yearly FDI flows over time in Iran is a subject of interest because
of the international sanctions that the country is under, its position as a petroleum
exporter, its pursuit of a civilian nuclear program, and its general significance in the
popular western imagination as a state that can contribute to the overall instability of the
region. The present study is useful because Iran can be looked at from an international
relations perspective and a non-comparativist perspective. While a comparativist
perspective is of no doubt great use to studying any country, in this situation it can be
useful to first present Iran as a set of quantifiable variables for a hypothetical investor
who has no knowledge of the internal politics and relationships with other major powers
in the region or in relationship with the global dominant power.

To that end, Iran will

be analyzed in the same manner as the region, with no attention paid to any one particular
variable.
This study argues that FDI is moved by four classes of variables: macroeconomic,
government performance, country risk, and war. Using a stepwise regression method,
one model of predictors was generated. Follows is a discussion of the results in three
parts. First, the validity of the findings is presented, addressing autocorrelation and
multicollinearity. Second, the correlations of the independent variables with FDI are
presented and discussed in relation to the hypotheses and the overall theory. Third, the
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results of the stepwise regression are presented and discussed in relation to the
hypotheses and the overall theory. Last, the overall theoretical significance of the Rsquare and selected predictors are discussed, comparisons are made to the existing
literature, and conclusions are drawn.
As discussed in the variables section, above, this study employs four variables
that may be susceptible to first-order autocorrelation. They are the dependent variable
FDI, the macroeconomic variables GDP Growth Rate and Openness, and the political
variable of Relative Political Extraction. The regional test results are listed in Table 2
Regional Analysis Coefficients. The test employed for autocorrelation was the Durbin
Watson significance statistic. Here, n = 15 and the Durbin Watson statistic is 0.862.
Using the Savin and White (Savin 1977) tables for models where n = 15 and there are 7
regressors plus an intercept term, the lower bound (dL) is .226 and the upper bound (dU)
is 2.530. The observed value is not less than the dL nor is higher than dU, and therefore
the test for autocorrelation is inconclusive.
Next, multicollinearity was tested by examining the Significance (1-tailed) score
and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and tolerances. For the predictive model generated
for the Iran analysis, the tolerances were well outside the bounds for multicollinearity to
be a concern, as were the VIFs. The test results for Iran can be found in Table 32 Iran
Analysis Coefficients.
In the following discussion, the degree to which the general theory of FDI
determinants is supported is analyzed through the results of the positive and negative
correlations of the dependent variable against the seven regressors.
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As expected in the general hypotheses and consistent with the regional results of
this study, all macroeconomic variables (GDP Growth 0.516, Openness 0.680),
government performance (RPE 0.393), and low country risk (a score of 40/100) (Country
Risk 0.584) correlated positively with yearly flows of FDI over time (see Table 33 Iran
Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients). GDP Growth and Country Risk were
significant at 5% and Openness was significant at 1%. Compared to the Regional
analysis, the correlations for Iran were stronger and more significant, suggesting an
excellent environment for investment (see Table 34 Region vs. Iran Pearson Correlation
Coefficients Comparison). For the period under analysis, there were no incidents of all
three types of war so their lack of correlation is moot.
The stepwise regression of the seven independent variables used in this study
against the dependent variable of FDI yielded an R square of 0.462, with Openness
selected as the sole predictor (see Table 32 Iran Analysis Coefficients). The model
representing this relationship is as follows:
µ {Y|X}= β0+ β1 (Openness)
Where Y equals FDI and X is the selected predictor variable.
Conclusions of Iran Analysis
The predictor of Openness being the only one selected as accounting for the
variance does not lend support to the general theory that yearly flows of FDI over time
are moved by macroeconomic, government performance, country risk, and war factors
(see Table 35 Region vs. Iran Selected Model Predictors Comparison). All other
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dependent variables in this study selected all the independent variables (where data was
present) as predictors of yearly FDI flows over time. Here, Openness being selected as
the sole predictor suggests that the variance in yearly FDI flows in Iran is attributable to
macroeconomic factors only. Recall that Openness is operationalized as the ratio of the
sum of exports and imports to GDP.
The existence of positive correlations with FDI by all the variables lends strong
support for the general theory. Although there was only one regressor chosen as
accounting for the variance in FDI flows over the period under study, the selection of
Openness is helpful in assessing for the potential investor the conditions that lend
themselves to a prudent decision to invest in Iran. Openness can be conceptualized as a
variable that captures an unquantifiable posture of government to engage with other states
through trade. Iran has been the target of numerous economic sanctions yet its outward
posture has remained open to trade and has shown a positive orientation to have a
macroeconomic policy that allows the ingress and egress of investment while other states
may take measures to frustrate that posture.
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Chapter 6 - Overall Conclusions and Limitations of the Model Presented
Overall Conclusions
Follows is a discussion of the overall conclusions drawn from the regional and country
level analyses, and how the results of the correlations and predictors selected compare.
For a side-by-side comparison of the Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the region and
all countries under sub-analysis see Table 36 Region vs. All Country Sub-Analyses
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparisons. For a side-by-side comparison of the
selected predictors for the region and all countries under sub-analysis see Table 37
Region vs. All Country Sub-Analyses Selected Model Predictors Comparisons.
One of the most important findings of this study is the prominent role that
Openness plays in accounting for the variance in FDI and in its significance in correlating
with FDI at both the regional level and country level. In the sub-analysis of Iran where
only one predictor was selected in the stepwise regression Openness was the one that was
selected. Furthermore, Openness tended to correlate the highest with FDI and was
significant at 1% for five of the eight country sub-analyses was significant at 5% for one,
had the same sign for one, and was negatively correlated in only one instance. Openness
suggests that there is a latent mover of FDI undetectable by the model of this study. This
mover perhaps could be a country's policy orientation. If that is the case, then the
findings of this study when used in conjunction with a comparativist approach could
yield important insights as to the particular country dynamics and movers of FDI.
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The role of RPE in accounting for flows of FDI over time was less than expected.
However, there are some conclusions that can be drawn from this. Government
performance is an indicator of the potential of a government to carry out goals that it
considers important to the national interest. Therefore, where FDI is considered to be a
national goal then it can be expected that we will see a high correlation with Openness
because Openness is a trade posture made tangible by the quantifiable ingress and egress
of products and services. Thus, where Government Performance does not emerge in the
regional analysis or in a country level analysis as significant may indicate that FDI is not
a significant national goal. Indeed, in the Gulf states where there is a high dependency on
revenue based on petroleum reserves and exports it can be observed that the correlations
between FDI and RPE, FDI and Openness, and Openness and RPE are low.
Country Risk as a predictor of FDI flows performed as expected. It correlated
positively with FDI (0.130) and was significant at 5%. This follows with what may be
intuitively expected by a hypothetical investor. Countries with low levels of economic
risk (bank stability/ risk, GNP outlook, unemployment rate, government finances,
monetary policy/ currency stability), low levels of political risk (corruption, government
non-payments/ non-repatriation, government stability, information access/ transparency,
institutional risk, regulatory and a favorable policy environment), and low structural risk
(demographics, hard infrastructure, labor market/ industrial relations, soft infrastructure)
will be seen as favorable to outside investors. Thus it is supported that an investor can
gain a good picture of the predictors of FDI flows by looking at Openness and Country
Risk alone.
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The presence of war or occurrence of past wars (or indeed anticipation of wars)
were not as determinative of variance of FDI flows and did not always have a significant
negative impact. The instructive conclusion of this for the hypothetical investor is that
the intrastate geographic location, duration, and nature of the war are more important
than the fact that it is a war (and embodies the attendant chaos that wars conjure up in the
popular imagination). In that regard, the hypothetical investor should consult with
regional or country experts before withdrawing FDI based solely on the presence of war.
The overall conclusion of this study is that variance of FDI flows are best
conceptualized as stemming from the presence of multiple classes of predictors. The four
classes of Macroeconomic, Political, Country Risk, and War are conceptually sound, and
provide a full picture of investment dynamics. While the results were not robust at the
regional level (for reasons explained above) they were particularly encouraging at the
country level. Additionally, of great interest is that this model may be used in a
diagnostic capacity to reveal the presence of a variable that is unique to one country. The
Iran analysis demonstrated that where all variables had the expected sign and three out of
four of those were at 5% or 1% the selection of only one predictor points to an exogenous
dynamic affecting the variance of FDI. In all other sub-analyses where a variable was
highly correlated it was selected as a predictor. The Iran results suggest that perhaps a
variable like sanctions is effecting the ability of strong GDP Growth, good Government
Performance, low Country Risk (all which normally indicate a good environment for
investing) to effect FDI flows. Thus, the model generated by this study can be used as a
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diagnostic tool for countries whose FDI flows may be profoundly moved by unique and
uncommon exogenous shocks.
Limitations of the Model Presented
The cases selection for this study was based on Lemke's (2002) definition of the
Middle East with the addition of Pakistan. Pakistan was included due to its proximity to
Iran and its recent geopolitical importance in the United States' military operations in the
region. Some area studies scholars may disagree with this definition of the region, citing
instead the United States Department of State ordering of the Middle East as Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Gaza Strip, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, West Bank, and Yemen. Nevertheless,
this study was predicated on data availability and a conceptualization of the Middle East
that also maintains an element of arbitrariness to avoid issues of tautology were case
selection be determined by trade blocks or on bilateral trade agreements. Future studies
may consider apply stricter selection of cases or an expansion of the units of analysis in
order to increase the sample size and the robustness of results. Similarly, future studies
may employ this study's model to assess its applicability cross-regionally or globally.
This study faced limitations in its time series due to data availability or
unreliability. Afghanistan would have been included had there been any reliable
macroeconomic or stability indicator data preceding 2001. This study was also limited to
cases ending in 2007, thereby unfortunately missing some macroeconomic, country risk,
and war events of great significance.
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This study has considered other measurements of trade flows that may have been
substituted for FDI as the dependent variable. For future research the relationship
between FDI and portfolio flows should be considered. Assessing the correlations
between them may indicate if one is moving the other. To that end data from the
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) from the International Monetary Fund
may be used.
As discussed in the variables section, above, this study employs four variables
that may be susceptible to first-order autocorrelation. They are the dependent variable
FDI, the macroeconomic variables GDP Growth Rate and Openness, and the political
variable of Relative Political Extraction. While a great effort was made in the conceptual
design of this study to avoid endogeneity and compound variables they still remain an
issue. The Durbin-Watson test concluded that autocorrelation could not be ruled out,
leaving the issue of compound variables requiring further assessment as it may present
problems with a larger data set and greater time series.
Country Risk was measured based solely on macreconomic conditions. However,
as noted in the literature review, there are other conceptualizations of risk that consider
political conditions such as regime stability, forced elections or frequency of elections,
institutional stability and so forth.

Additional indicators of risk were considered but

data availability proved to be a problem. For example, the Corruption Perception Index
was considered as an additional independent variable but data points were not available
for all countries for all years. Another type of risk that pertains to macroeconomic
conditions is the risk that the investor themselves is willing to expose themselves to that
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is independent of third-party assessments of market or issue risk in target countries. Thus
the perennial problem of the "emotional investor" and how to measure it is an issue that
must be taken into account when calculating country risk.
Regime type was considered as independent variable moving flows of FDI.
Future studies may want to consider using not just regime type but the degree of type
using, for example, Freedom House ratings. One problem that this may raise is that
variance must be considered when looking at more stable regions or aggregating stable
regions with less stable as the fluctuations in degree of regime type in less stable
countries may skew the correlations.
The last explanatory variable that may be refined regards Government
Performance. This study used the measure of Relative Political Capacity. However, the
measurement of Relative Political Allocation (RPA) may give an indication of the efforts
a target country is expending to attract FDI, and not just its efficiency of government.
Last, a time series anlaysis of the region and the country studies was outside the
scope of this study. Future research could take into account the time series effects of the
independent variables and determine if the model has a forecasting ability. To that end,
to find the best fit of a time series to past values of this time series the Box-Jenkins test
could be employed.
Further applications of the model could be in combining historical data with
forecasts of the significant macroeconomic variables of this study (Openness, GDP
Growth and Country Risk) in order to delineate trends of FDI. Additionally, historical
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and forecasted Government Performance data can be useful alongside such a proposed
application to determine whether or not Government Performance should be of concern
when making decisions on FDI. Last, applications of the model could be made at the
sub-national level by substituting violent crime rates for war.
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Model
1
(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate
War
Intrastate
War
Extrastate
War

Std. Error
.034
.001
.000
.019
.000
.061
.057
.033

.882
.001
.001
.081
.001
-.030
.081
-.035

B

Unstandardized
Coefficients

-.073

.093

.055
.461
.320
.112
-.035

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients

-1.061

1.412

t
26.169
.798
6.274
4.391
1.603
-.496

.290

.160

Sig.
.000
.426
.000
.000
.111
.621

-.101

-.032

.030

.194

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.815
.948
-.001
.003
.001
.002
.045
.118
.000
.001
-.152
.091

Re gional Analysis Coefficients

Table 2 Regional Analysis Coefficients

-.018

.010

-.077

.102

.058
.415
.304
.116
-.036

Partial

Correlations

.102
.332
.096
.130
-.069

Zeroorder

-.069

.091

.052
.406
.284
.104
-.032

Part

.891

.959

.873
.774
.786
.854
.838

Tolerance

1.122

1.043

1.145
1.292
1.272
1.171
1.194

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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R = 0.209

2

Regional Analysis Correlations and Model Results - Pearson Correlation Coefficients
FDI Plus 10
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
.102
.332
.096
.130
-.069
.010
-.018
GDP Growth
0.102
1.000
.071
-.048
.080
-.343
.037
-.070
Openness**
0.332
.071
1.000
-.397
.161
.030
-.152
.124
RPE
0.096
-.048
-.397
1.000
-.241
.020
-.027
.112
Country Risk*
0.130
.080
.161
-.241
1.000
-.200
-.083
-.231
Interstate War
-0.069
-.343
.030
.020
-.200
1.000
-.015
.160
Intrastate War
0.010
.037
-.152
-.027
-.083
-.015
1.000
-.029
Extrastate War
-0.018
-.070
.124
.112
-.231
.160
-.029
1.000
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Table 3 Regional Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients
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Model
1
(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate
War
Extrastate
War

B

Std. Error
.199
.002
.001
.149
.001
.032
.034

.996
.000
.006
-.344
.001
-.005
.021

Unstandardized
Coefficients

.130

-.040
1.115
-.746
.257
-.033

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients

.624

t
5.004
-.212
5.452
-2.307
.807
-.171
.550

Sig.
.001
.837
.001
.050
.443
.868
-.058

.101

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.537
1.455
-.004
.003
.004
.009
-.688
.000
-.002
.004
-.078
.068

Turkey Analysis Coefficients

Table 4 Turkey Analysis Coefficients

-.155

.216

-.075
.888
-.632
.274
-.060

Partial

Correlations

.052
.550
-.262
.111
-.185

Zeroorder

.093

-.032
.815
-.345
.121
-.026

Part

.512

.619
.534
.214
.220
.603

Tolerance

1.952

1.616
1.871
4.674
4.550
1.657

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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R = 0.821

2

Turkey Analysis, Correlations and Model Summary - Pearson Coefficient Correlations
FDI Plus 10
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
.052
.550
-.262
.111
-.185
-.155
GDP Growth
.052
1.000
.090
.020
-.118
-.434
.174
Openness *
.550
.090
1.000
.551
-.630
-.167
.051
RPE
-.262
.020
.551
1.000
-.740
-.072
.442
Country Risk
.111
-.118
-.630
-.740
1.000
-.107
-.032
Interstate War
-.185
-.434
-.167
-.072
-.107
1.000
-.071
Intrastate War
1.000
Extrastate War
-.155
.174
.051
.442
-.032
-.071
1.000
* Significant at 5%

Table 5 Turkey Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 6 Region vs. Turkey Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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Turkey - DV 2 Net
Change in FDI
0.052
0.55*
-0.262
0.111
-0.185
-0.155

Table 7 Region vs. Turkey Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Turkey - DV 2 Net
Change in FDI
X
X
X
X
X
na
X

0.209

0.821

Yes

Yes
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Model
1

(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk

B
.600
-.002
.005
.037
.001

Std. Error
.218
.011
.002
.076
.003

Unstandardized
Coefficients

-.064
.829
.120
.083

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients
t
2.756
-.198
3.392
.483
.252

Sig.
.020
.847
.007
.639
.806

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.115
1.086
-.027
.023
.002
.009
-.133
.207
-.005
.007

Saudi Arabia Analysis Coefficients

-.062
.731
.151
.079

Partial

Correlations

.124
.729
-.215
-.040

Zeroorder

Table 8 Saudi Arabia Analysis Coefficients

-.041
.706
.101
.052

Part

.410
.725
.698
.402

Tolerance

2.436
1.378
1.433
2.488

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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R = 0.567

2

Saudia Arabia Analysis, Correlations and Model Summary - Pearson Correlation Coefficients
FDI Plus 10
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
.124
.729
-.215
-.040
GDP Growth
.124
1.000
.346
-.299
-.750
Openness**
.729
.346
1.000
-.467
-.263
RPE
-.215
-.299
-.467
1.000
.391
Country Risk
-.040
-.750
-.263
.391
1.000
Interstate War
1.000
Intrastate War
1.000
Extrastate War
1.000
** Significant at 1%

Table 9 Saudi Arabia Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 10 Region vs. Saudi Arabia Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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Saudi Arabia - IV 1
GDP Growth
0.124
0.729**
-0.215
-0.04

Table 11 Region vs. Saudi Arabia Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Saudi Arabia - IV 1
GDP Growth
X
X
X
X
na
na
na

0.209

0.567

Yes

Yes
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Model
1

(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate
War
Extrastate
War
.055

.037

Beta

B
Std. Error
1.001
.114
-4.787E-05
.000
4.682E-05
.000
-.005
.083
-.001
.002
-.059
.071
.975

-.040
.057
-.030
-.109
-.632

Standardized
Coefficients

Unstandardized
Coefficients

1.473

t
8.776
-.119
.116
-.058
-.509
-.829
.237

Sig.
.003
.913
.915
.958
.646
.468
-.064

.173

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.638
1.364
-.001
.001
-.001
.001
-.268
.258
-.006
.004
-.287
.168

Iraq Analysis Coefficients

Table 12 Iraq Analysis Coefficients

.778

.648

-.068
.067
-.033
-.282
-.432

Partial

Correlations

.215
-.515
-.781
-.113
-.257

Zeroorder

.243

-.020
.019
-.010
-.084
-.137

Part

.062

.238
.112
.102
.591
.047

Tolerance

16.138

4.209
8.901
9.816
1.693
21.398

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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R = 0.919

2

Iraq Anlaysis, Correlations and Model Summary - Pearson Correaltion Coefficients
FDI Plus 10
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
.215
-.515
-.781
-.113
-.257
.778
GDP Growth
.215
1.000
-.240
-.190
.313
-.658
-.122
Openness
-.515
-.240
1.000
.105
.284
.678
-.122
RPE **
-.781
-.190
.105
1.000
-.201
.075
-.759
Country Risk
-.113
.313
.284
-.201
1.000
.120
.064
Interstate War
-.257
-.658
.678
.075
.120
1.000
.333
Intrastate War
1.000
Extrastate War **
.778
-.122
-.122
-.759
.064
.333
1.000
** Significant at 1%

Table 13 Iraq Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 14 Region vs. Iraq Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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Iraq - IV 2, 4, 7
Openness,
Country Risk High,
Extrastate War
0.215
-0.515
-.781**
-0.113
-0.257
0.778**

Table 15 Region vs. Iraq Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Iraq - IV 2, 4, 7
Openness,
Country Risk High,
Extrastate War
X
X
X
X
X
na
X

0.209

0.919

Yes

Yes
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Model
1

(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Extrastate
War

.709
.009
.006
-.402
.007
.010

B

Std. Error
.404
.006
.002
.215
.003
.033

Unstandardized
Coefficients

.313
.643
-.421
.461
.058

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients
t
1.753
1.507
3.128
-1.868
2.232
.302

Sig.
.113
.166
.012
.095
.053
.770

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-.206
1.623
-.005
.023
.002
.010
-.888
.085
.000
.015
-.065
.084

Israel Analysis Coefficients

Table 16 Israel Analysis Coefficients

.449
.722
-.529
.597
.100

Partial

Correlations

.312
.708
-.413
.066
.026

Zeroorder

.247
.513
-.306
.366
.049

Part

.624
.636
.527
.629
.737

Tolerance

1.601
1.573
1.896
1.589
1.357

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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R = 0.758

2

Israel Analysis, Correlations and Model Summary - Pearson Coefficient Correlations
FDI Plus 10
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
.312
.708
-.413
.066
.026
GDP Growth
.312
1.000
.056
.308
.259
-.453
Openness**
.708
.056
1.000
-.522
-.383
.061
RPE
-.413
.308
-.522
1.000
.553
-.119
Country Risk
.066
.259
-.383
.553
1.000
.045
Interstate War
1.000
Intrastate War
1.000
Extrastate War
.026
-.453
.061
-.119
.045
1.000
** Significant at 1%

Table 17 Israel Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 18 Region vs. Israel Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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Israel - IV 3 RPE
0.312
0.708**
-0.413
0.066

0.026

Table 19 Region vs. Israel Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Israel - IV 3 RPE
X
X
X
X
na
na
X

0.209

0.758

Yes

Yes
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Model
1

(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk

B
Std. Error
-.571
.286
.007
.004
.005
.001
.702
.230
.010
.003

Unstandardized
Coefficients

.274
.685
.402
.433

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients
t
-1.997
1.955
5.481
3.048
3.188

Sig.
.074
.079
.000
.012
.010

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-1.208
.066
-.001
.016
.003
.007
.189
1.216
.003
.017

United Arab Emirates Analysis Coefficients

.526
.866
.694
.710

Partial

Correlations

.284
.723
.476
.191

Zeroorder

Table 20 United Arab Emirates Analysis Coefficients

.242
.679
.378
.395

Part

.782
.983
.885
.831

Tolerance

1.279
1.017
1.130
1.203

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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R = 0.846

2

FDI Plus 10 Log
GDP Growth
Openness **
RPE *
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
**Significant at 1%

FDI Plus 10
Log
1.000
.284
.723
.476
.191

GDP
Growth
Openness
.284
.723
1.000
.083
.083
1.000
.316
.114
-.401
-.072
RPE
.476
.316
.114
1.000
-.209

Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
Risk
War
War
War
.191
-.401
-.072
-.209
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Table 21 United Arab Emirates Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 22 Region vs. United Arab Emirates Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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United Arab
Emirates - IV 4
Country Risk Low
0.284
0.723**
0.476*
0.191

Table 23 Region vs. United Arab Emirates Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

United Arab
Emirates - IV 4
Country Risk Low
X
X
X
X
na
na
na

0.209

0.846

Yes

Yes
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Model
1

(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate
War
Intrastate
War

Std. Error
.122
.005
.003
.083
.001
.030
.025

.713
.002
.010
-.030
.001
.054
-.027

B

Unstandardized
Coefficients

-.311

.125
.865
-.098
.362
.378

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients

-1.116

t
5.863
.498
3.261
-.359
1.542
1.816
.297

Sig.
.000
.632
.012
.729
.162
.107
-.084

.029

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.433
.994
-.008
.013
.003
.017
-.221
.161
-.001
.004
-.014
.122

Pakistan Analysis Coe fficients

.437

-.367

.173
.755
-.126
.479
.540

Partial

Correlations

.527
.823
-.476
.445
-.135

Zeroorder

Table 24 Pakistan Analysis Coefficients

-.178

.079
.519
-.057
.245
.289

Part

.326

.403
.360
.342
.460
.583

Tolerance

3.065

2.478
2.778
2.921
2.173
1.715

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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R = 0.797

2

Pakistan Analysis, Correlations and Model Summary - Pearson Coefficient Correlations
FDI Plus
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
10Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
.527
.823
-.476
.445
-.135
.437
GDP Growth *
.527
1.000
.592
-.520
.277
-.082
.738
Openness **
.823
.592
1.000
-.683
.407
-.393
.582
RPE *
-.476
-.520
-.683
1.000
-.052
.312
-.573
Country Risk *
.445
.277
.407
-.052
1.000
-.481
.407
Interstate War
-.135
-.082
-.393
.312
-.481
1.000
-.134
Intrastate War
.437
.738
.582
-.573
.407
-.134
1.000
Extrastate War
1.000
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Table 25 Pakistan Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 26 Region vs. Pakistan Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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Pakistan - IV 6
Intrastate War
0.527*
0.823**
-0.476*
0.445*
-0.135
0.437

Table 27 Region vs. Pakistan Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Pakistan - IV 6
Intrastate War
X
X
X
X
X
X

0.209

0.797

Yes

Yes
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Model
1

(Constant)
GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk

B
Std. Error
1.333
.678
-.039
.015
.009
.004
-.808
.712
-.016
.007

Unstandardized
Coefficients

-.543
.536
-.279
-.503

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients
t
1.967
-2.573
2.008
-1.135
-2.315

Sig.
.078
.028
.072
.283
.043

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-.177
2.843
-.072
-.005
-.001
.018
-2.395
.779
-.032
-.001

Bahrain Analysis Coefficients

-.631
.536
-.338
-.591

Partial

Correlations

-.391
.261
-.352
-.423

Zeroorder

Table 28 Bahrain Analysis Coefficients

-.472
.369
-.208
-.425

Part

.758
.473
.559
.714

Tolerance

1.319
2.113
1.788
1.401

VIF

Collinearity Statistics

114

R = 0.663

2

Bahrain Analysis Correlations and Model Summary - Pearson Correlation Coefficients
FDI Plus 10
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
-.391
.261
-.352
-.423
GDP Growth
-.391
1.000
.411
-.373
.345
Openness
.261
.411
1.000
-.614
.443
RPE
-.352
-.373
-.614
1.000
-.107
Country Risk
-.423
.345
.443
-.107
1.000
Interstate War
1.000
Intrastate War
1.000
Extrastate War
1.000

Table 29 Bahrain Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 30 Region vs. Bahrain Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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Bahrain Petroleum
Dependent
Country
-0.391
0.261
-0.352
-0.423

Table 31 Region vs. Bahrain Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Bahrain Petroleum
Dependent
Country
X
X
X
X
na
na
na

0.209

0.663

Yes

Yes
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Model
1

(Constant)
Openness

B

Std. Error
.928
.031
.002
.001

Unstandardized
Coefficients

.680

Beta

Standardized
Coefficients
t
29.524
3.343

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
Sig.
.000
.860
.996
.005
.001
.004

Iran Analysis Coefficients

Table 32 Iran Analysis Coefficients

.680

Partial

Correlations

.680

Zeroorder

.680

Part

1.000

Tolerance

1.000

VIF

Collinearity Statistics

118

R = 0.462

2

* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%

Iran Analysis Correlations and Model Results - Pearson Correlation Coefficients
FDI Plus
GDP
Country
Interstate
Intrastate Extrastate
10Log
Growth
Openness
RPE
Risk
War
War
War
FDI Plus 10 Log
1.000
.516
.680
.393
.584
GDP Growth *
.516
1.000
.369
.620
-.044
Openness **
.680
.369
1.000
.531
.627
RPE
.393
.620
.531
1.000
-.038
Country Risk *
.584
-.044
.627
-.038
1.000
Interstate War
1.000
Intrastate War
1.000
Extrastate War
1.000

Table 33 Iran Analysis Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Table 34 Region vs. Iran Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 FDI
0.102
0.332**
0.096
0.130*
-0.069
0.010
-0.018
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Iran - Country of
Interest
0.516*
0.68**
0.393
0.584*

Table 35 Region vs. Iran Selected Model Predictors Comparison

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
R2
Theory
Supported?

Region - DV 1 FDI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Iran - Country of
Interest
X

na
na
na

0.209

0.462

Yes

No
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GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
* Significant at 5%;
** Significant at 1%

Region - DV 1 Turkey -DV 2
FDI
FDI
0.102
0.052
0.55*
0.332**
0.096
-0.262
0.111
0.130*
-0.185
-0.069
0.010
-0.155
-0.018
0.778**

0.026

Iraq - IV 2, 4, 7
Openness,
Saudi Arabia - Country Risk
IV 1 GDP
High,
Israel - IV 3
Growth
Extrastate War RPE
0.124
0.215
0.312
0.729**
-0.515
0.708**
-0.215
-.781**
-0.413
-0.04
-0.113
0.066
-0.257

United Arab
Emirates - IV 4
Country Risk Pakistan - IV 6
Low
Intrastate War
0.284
0.527*
0.723**
0.823**
0.476*
-0.476*
0.191
0.445*
-0.135
0.437

Regional and Country Pearson Correlation Comparisons

Bahrain Petroleum
Dependent
Country
-0.391
0.261
-0.352
-0.423

Iran - Country
of Interest
0.516*
0.68**
0.393
0.584*

Table 36 Region vs. All Country Sub-Analyses Pearson Correlation Coefficients Comparisons
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R
Theory Supported?

2

GDP Growth
Openness
RPE
Country Risk
Interstate War
Intrastate War
Extrastate War
0.209
Yes

0.821
Yes

0.567
Yes

0.919
Yes

0.758
Yes

Iraq - IV 2, 4, 7
Openness,
Saudi Arabia - Country Risk
Region - DV 1 Turkey - DV 2 IV 1 GDP
Israel - IV 3
High,
FDI
FDI
Growth
Extrastate War RPE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
na
X
na
X
na
na
na
na
X
X
na
X
X
0.846
Yes

0.797
Yes

United Arab
Emirates - IV 4
Country Risk Pakistan - IV 6
Low
Intrastate War
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
na
X
na
X
na

Regional and Country Model Validity Comparisons

0.663
Yes

Bahrain Petroleum
Dependent
Country
X
X
X
X
na
na
na

0.462
No

na
na
na

X

Iran - Country
of Interest

Table 37 Region vs. All Country Sub-Analyses Selected Model Predictors Comparisons
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Interstate Wars
War Name
State Name
War for Kosovo Turkey
Kargil War
Pakistan
Start Year
1999
1999

End Year

Where Fought
1999 Europe
1999 Asia

Initiator
Yes
Yes

Table 38 Interstate Wars

Outcome
Winner
Loser

0
698

Battle Deaths
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Intrastate Wars
WarName
Sixth Iraqi Kurds
Waziristan
SideA
Iraq
Pakistan

SideB
PUK
Waziri tribes

ionalize Start Year End Year Where Fought
No
1996
1996 Middle East
Yes
2004
2006 Asia

Side A Deaths Side B Deaths
Initiator
Outcome
PUK
Stalemate
-9
-9
US & Pakistan Side B wins
1200
1800

Table 39 Intrastate Wars
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Imperial

Imperial

Imperial

Imperial

Imperial

Imperial

Iraqi Resistance

Iraqi Resistance

Iraqi Resistance

Iraqi Resistance

Iraqi Resistance

Iraqi Resistance

Imperial

Iraqi Resistance

Imperial

Imperial

Iraqi Resistance

Iraqi Resistance

Australia

Imperial

Iraqi Resistance

Republic of Korea

Iraq

Ukraine

Italy

Poland

Spain

Netherlands

United Kingdom

United States

Side A
Turkey
Israel

Extrastate Wars
War Name
War Type
Second PKK in Iraq Imperial
Al Aqsa Intifada
Colonial
Start Year

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

al-Qaeda & Iraqi resistence

Not Applicable

Side B
PKK in Iraq
Palestinians

End Year

Initiator
1997 Yes
2003 No

2006 No

2004 No

2005 No

2005 No

2004 Ongoing as of 12/31/2007
No

2004 Ongoing as of 12/31/2007
No

2004

2004 Ongoing as of 12/31/2007
No

2004

2004

2004

2003 Ongoing as of 12/31/2007
Yes

2003 Ongoing as of 12/31/2007
Yes

2003 Ongoing as of 12/31/2007
Yes

1997
2000

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

additional state
No
No

Table 40 Extrastate Wars

Outcome
Stalemate
Side A wins
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007
Ongoing as of
12/31/2007

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Middle East

Where Fought
Middle East
Middle East

Battle Deaths

1 Not Applicable

10800 Not Applicable

18 Not Applicable

33 Not Applicable

23 Not Applicable

11 Not Applicable

2 Not Applicable

143 Not Applicable

3985

20000

Non State Deaths
2500
3400
1 Not Applicable

100
900
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